The Movement of Restoring Film Industry in Cambodia by Teng Athipanha

The Movement of Restoring Film Industry in Cambodia by Teng Athipanha

Introduction

Film, as a source of entertainment and escapism, has played a crucial role throughout history. It serves beyond mere enjoyment, aiding in reconciling with the past, preserving traditions, and expressing national identity. During the twentieth century, the introduction of film in Southeast Asia varied across countries, primarily through colonial contact driven by various European powers, which significantly impacted the film industry. It has brought the introduction of technology to Southeast Asia, which marked the inception of a local film industry. Films began to incorporate local languages, music, settings, and actors, gradually gaining popularity among the local audience (Ang, 2021).  Despite initial developments, certain countries experienced downfall periods that erased progress. Cambodia, notably affected by the painful political history of the Khmer Rouge invasion, faced considerable challenges, including the film business.

The industry, which started in the 1950s and flourished during the “golden age” of the 1960s, suffered a severe blow after the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge, with many films stolen, destroyed, or lost. As a result of the lack of dynamism, the road to reconstructing the film industry has been very challenging.

Nevertheless, there has been recent growth in the film industry. Many filmmakers have striven to produce films of excellent quality from a technical aspect and conceptual standpoint, where they have explored new creative areas and a wider range of plots. This effort has been a great step thus far; even though there have been difficulties, there is still a lot of hope for the process of reviving the golden age.

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how Cambodia’s film industry has evolved over the years amidst challenges and opportunities. It will examine the history and efforts to revive it, along with the difficulties faced along the way, highlighting the industry’s significant steps toward a comeback.

Body

As mentioned earlier, colonial interactions played a pivotal role in introducing film to Southeast Asia. This marked a significant turning point in the regional film industry, facilitating the emergence of cinema and fostering a sense of local identity (Ang, 2021). For instance, films began to incorporate local languages, settings, and another cultural component (Ang, 2021). Like other countries in the region, Cambodia transformed cinema into a medium that resonated personally with audiences. This transformation ushered in the ‘Golden Era’ from the 1950s to the 1960s This era is defined by a period of remarkable significance and success, with its understanding deeply rooted in the accomplishments of that time within the industry.

The emergence of this era can be attributed to colonial contact. Furthermore, the contributions of pioneering filmmakers also play important role, including Roeum Phon, Eav Ponnakar, and Som Sam Al (Raksmey, 2023). These filmmakers, pursued their studies abroad, and had involved in the creation of the early Cambodian-produced films (Raksmey, 2023). According to Borak, many of these narratives incorporated with Khmer folktales, such as Puthisean Neang Kong Rey or the legend of Chao Srotop Chek (Raksmey, 2023).

Unfortunately, this era was short-lived due to the devastating Khmer Rouge invasion, which inflicted widespread harm, including the film industry. Many important social figures, including actors and filmmakers from the 1960s and 1970s, were killed as a result of their communist ideology and attempts to establish a classless agrarian society. Additionally, a considerable number of film and prints were lost, stolen, or destroyed during this period.  Therefore, the industry has to rebuild from scratch, journey which fraught with challenges. After the Khmer Rouge regime was overthrown, the industry began to slowly recover, with “My Mother is Arb” specifically contributing to the horror genre (Raksmey & Raksmey, 2023). Following that, the VHS became the primary shooting tool for a large number of movies. Even though it made it possible for more production companies to make more films, the drawback became more and more obvious, especially as production values dropped and there were fewer producers with expertise. Moreover, it has also been criticized for its inability to convey its own identity and be engaging due to its struggle and adherence to a predetermined narrative (RICHARDOT, 2013).

Distribution is another challenge, as filmmakers often struggle to recover their production costs due to a poorly structured market and the absence of an established intellectual property policy. Most films are distributed on home video rather than in theaters. VCDs are widely accessible on the market and are less expensive than theater tickets (Richardot, 2013). According to Ung Nareth, president of the Motion Picture Association of Cambodia, purchasing a new DVD at a retail price of even $7 is considered expensive for many Cambodians (Styllis, 2014). Therefore, as the informal market structure expands, it creates the image of the acceptability of the pirate business, which is very harmful to the industry.

Despite these challenges, the industry has seen progressive transformation in recent years, fueled by technological advancements and creative exploration by filmmakers. More filmmaker began to enhancing conceptual perspective and diversifying plotlines. Traditionally, film narratives often centered around genres like romance, horror, comedy, and folktale. In the recent year, however, Cambodia has achieved a milestone by producing its first-ever Sci-Fi film, namely ‘’Karmalink’’. It was collaboration of local filmmaker Sok Visal as a co-producer, who was directed by American Jake Wachtel. It was produced outside of traditional studio systems (Raksmey, 2023). The focus was more on artistic expression and cultural representation through the combination of Buddhist concepts and AI narrative components (Raksmey, 2023). Furthermore, there are also some film production and non-profit organization that has involve and support the new generation of filmmaker as well as fostering talented actor/actress.

  • Anti­Archive is the film productions that has been producing independent films, with the goal of encouraging viewers to rethink the relationship of films and filmmakers with the past and history. Diamond Island, one of their notable film, was premiered at the 2016 Cannes Film Festival Critic’s Week and earned the SACD Prize
  • The Acting Academy is a non-profit organization located in Phnom Penh, providing free training to young Khmer actors. Additionally, they invites expert coaches and lecturers to offer these aspiring actors and actresses the opportunity to explore various acting techniques.

Apart from that, there have been efforts to showcase local films to a global audience. Leak Lyda, the CEO of LD Film Production, noted his initiatives in his work, such as the horror film “12E,” for which they also created an English dubbed version targeting international viewers (Nou, 2023). Besides that, he also recently did a collaboration in the comedy film “Rent Boy” which featured Myanmar actor Paing Takhon alongside Cambodia’s 2022 Miss Grand Cambodia winner, Pich Vatey Saravathy, in the lead female role (Nou, 2023). While it is not the first time Cambodian actors have shared the screen with international stars, this progress shows a growing optimism about the potential for local films to gain exposure on the international stage.

To sum up, in attempt of restoring this sector has revealed a growth potential. It is thanks to the determined efforts of emerging talents, organizations, and filmmakers. What’s more, not only that it raises hopes of a return to the golden era but also going beyond it. Not to mention, with recent collaborations with foreign filmmakers, can bring fresh perspectives that would enhance the industry. This, in turn, has the potential to inspire the next generation of young filmmakers, fostering a brighter future for Cambodian cinema.

 

References:

 

Author:

Teng Athipanha (Intern at CESASS UGM)

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What the Mekong mean for Security in Southeast Asia: Hydro-Hegemony and Food Insecurity, or Cooperation by Thomas Robert Bartley

What the Mekong mean for Security in Southeast Asia: Hydro-Hegemony and Food Insecurity, or Cooperation by Thomas Robert Bartley

Southeast Asia is a region developing and expanding fast in terms of population, importance, and interconnectedness. While the future beckons promisingly for the continued success of the region, potential backsliding into instability threatens to change this trajectory. Non-traditional aspects of security now take the forefront of issues threatening this backsliding. While changes in the balance of power between Southeast Asian nations or the efficacy of institutions remain integral to the region’s future, threats like a warming and unpredictable climate or breaches in cyber-security now have the potential to drastically change the state of security in the region. 

The issue with perhaps the most disruptive potential is that of food security. While this largely has been considered an issue or goal of development studies, its impact on the security of nations is now being recognised as significant. Studies conducted for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show striking patterns of correlation between rising food prices and the emergence of disruption and conflict. This can range from spikes in anti-government sentiment and irregular migration, to the outbreak of civil conflict and upticks in participation in rebel movements and organised crime., Disruptions to the affordable and ready access to food will inevitably have severe impacts on the stability of any country. Reporting from Foreign Policy summates this idea in stating that lack of food security will have ‘serious implications for global political stability’, and that it could lead to ‘mass displacement as people migrate to more arable [regions] in search of stable food supplies’.

The ability of food insecurity to destabilise at the individual level as well as the national and international levels is what makes this threat particularly dramatic. Within the Southeast Asian region, food security is increasingly being cited as a cause for concern. According to recent indexing produced by The Economist, the region, not including Singapore, ranks 1.3 points below the global average., This ranking has the potential to deteriorate significantly given concerns for the long-term agricultural productivity in the region. Aside from sheerly security concerns, the risk also is also compounded by economic dimensions as import-export balances and national income are affected by reductions in agricultural production, requiring a higher reliance on foreign markets. 

The area of most concern within Southeast Asia is the potentially exponential deterioration of production depending on the Mekong River System. As the river flows through Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar, deterioration in the system would represent a significant issue afflicting Southeast Asia as a whole. The river currently discharges an estimated 475 cubic kilometres of fresh water annually, feeding a delta of 795,000 km2 in size. The benefits of this flow are felt to such an extent that the river is sometimes referred to as the ‘mother of waters’, reflecting its importance to the lives of tens of millions of people. 

Deteriorations in the river system are a particular concern for the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam and the Tonle Sap region of Cambodia. The former of these regions is responsible for 90% of the rice exports of Vietnam and the livelihoods of 17 million people, whilst the collapse of the later would define Cambodia as a failed state., On current trajectory, Laos and Cambodia are predicted to be unable to match domestic production with domestic demand by 2030. While these events would cause significant harm and displacement for the people of these countries, the effects of this contingency would inevitably spill across borders, potentially causing sharp increases in food prices and reductions in food availability throughout Southeast Asia. This undoubtedly would be felt in conjunction with other economical or security concerns that go along with having increasingly insecure neighbours.

This issue takes particular relevance given current developments afflicting the Mekong. As the river crosses through multiple nations, many issues persist around shared management of the system. Here, unilateral decisions, especially those like the damming of the river, are a particular cause for concern. These developments can have drastic impacts for downstream productivity. In particular, projects such as damming are seen to have a substantial impact on sediment deposits and water availability for downstream populations.  This makes agricultural yields in any given area harder to predict, hurting the ability of small-scale farmers to plan for the future, and making agricultural investments seem riskier. Additionally, increasing rates of glacial melt at the sources of the river in the Tibetan Plateau further complicate the issue by causing seasonal flows to become increasingly erratic. While these developments may be approached and mitigated through the use of effective multilateral action, there are strong incentives for some states to resist concerted action, or to otherwise seek benefit from their geographic positioning at the detriment of other regional players. 

In explaining why this may be the case, considering how cooperation on this issue is incentivised or disincentivised provides a road map for current patterns of behaviour. When it comes to the issue of increasing rates of glacial melt, the reasoning behind lack of effective action is similar to lethargies affecting other environmental issues. That is, as the phenomenon is caused by increasing carbon emissions globally, the attribution of blame or responsibility becomes difficult, hindering effective approaches to the issue. The cost of action would also be high, likely requiring significant systemic change with no promise of reciprocation from other stake holders. However, costs of inaction could verge on being catastrophic. A UNESCO report states that the glaciated regions of Asia are the fastest receding in the world. The report estimated that the water requirements of over a billion people are met by these glaciers. In South Asia alone, increased rates of melt are expected to affect well over 177 million people in terms of income and livelihood. 

As most Southeast Asian nations are positioned geographically far from the glaciated areas feeding the Mekong, it will however remain difficult to direct regional attention to the issue. East and South Asian countries positioned relatively closer to the sources of the river may have a greater role to play in initiating dialogue and coordinated responses. Considering that the health of the Mekong is integral to the futures of some Southeast Asian nations, such actions would signify a great deal of regional responsibility and forward thinking on the part of instigating nations. This may entail the creation of water sharing agreements, information sharing initiatives, and memorandums of understanding regarding norms and expectations of behaviour which affects the river. An appreciation of the spill-over effects of food insecurity and broader regional malaise is required in order to make such decisions. This would come as an alternative to potential zero-sum thinking pursued through conventional geopolitics. While there are areas of concern that South-Eastern Mekong states should act upon (like unsustainable activities or overuse of the Delta), responsibility for a large amount of the river’s health lies with upstream states. 

The greatest present risk to the future productivity of the region is the feared ‘sinking of the Mekong’. The Delta’s land mass (primarily located in Vietnam) is sustained through constant flow of sediment from upstream, mentioned earlier. Because of this, any alterations to these flows will impact the total land mass available for productive activities. While decreasing flows from glaciers may impact this in the future, more immediately impactful is the development of damming projects in upstream states. At the date of writing, these dams are primarily located in China with some beginning to appear in Laos. The eight currently finished damming projects have already affected around 50% of the usual sediment flows. If additional damming projects are completed as planned, sediment deposits will be restricted by more than 96% of their current levels. Such development of the river also has the potential to restrict migratory fish and their breeding patterns, further harming productivity of downstream fisheries. Fishermen in the region already express worries about the future of their wellbeing, lamenting the change in their catch from only a decade earlier.

The substantial impacts of this damming can point to potentially callous disregard for water and food security on the part of upstream states. The impacts on Vietnamese and Cambodian productive regions in particular point to large absences in regional responsibility especially as it regards policy actions from Beijing. Current publications note the effect of the Mekong’s damming to be excessive, potentially leading to complete inundation of the Mekong Delta by the turn of the century. This phenomenon will occur as the rate of sediment deposit is eventually exceeded by rates of sea-level rise; it is likely this will be accompanied by a salination of the delta, limiting agricultural and fishery productivity to a fraction of current levels. This could become a direct cause of failure for food security in two Southeast Asian nations, with certain ramifications for surrounding countries. The pursuit of energy security on the part of the Chinese state is noted, however, the benefits of these projects may quickly lead to the emergence of a flashpoint in the region. Calls from lower Mekong states to cease the damming have become louder in recent years, especially from the sub-state level. Hearing and responding to these calls is likely to bring higher levels of sustained benefit for Beijing.  

The falsification of Chinese led narratives, however, prompts speculation that the behaviour is likely to be unyielding. With regards to Mekong damming, one article published by China’s Global Times is titled: ‘from being responsible neighbour to biodiversity protection vanguard’. The article criticises the prevalence of ‘Western media outlets … bashing Chinese hydropower stations, claiming that the Chinese stations at upstream of Mekong River are responsible for aggravating droughts in downstream countries’. In response to this criticism, the outlet instead claims Chinese hydropower projects have a positive role to play in flood mitigation and biodiversity promotion. This is in stark contrast with facts on the ground, where substantial flooding in Cambodia is directly attributable to the dams. 

In South Asia, this pattern of behaviour is mirrored. A recent ‘super hydropower’ damming project proposed by Beijing on the Brahmaputra River also points to an apparent disregard for consequence. The project has stoked fears in India regarding declines in the availability of water in the productive regions of the river basin. The seeming disregard for these concerns has led commentators to point to the potential goal of ‘hydro-hegemony’ being pursued by the Chinese state. In commenting on the prospects of damming Asian rivers, The Diplomat notes the potential for the management of transboundary river systems to be influenced by ‘the greater socio-political context’ existing between nations.  By this it is meant that there are potentially strong incentives for transboundary systems to be wielded as a tool of geopolitical leverage. 

However, while the presence of transboundary rivers may exacerbate tensions, they may also be used to facilitate cooperation on a greater level. The common good of the river systems and associated environmental goods can provide a tangible source of shared responsibility. Philip Hirsch, a commentator on the region, points to this dichotomy of potential outcomes in stating that ‘perhaps in no other arena is the conflation of geopolitics with the environmental agenda as significant as in the case of transboundary river basins.’ Given the potentially disastrous effects on non-cooperation, particularly as caused through the use of damming for hydroelectric purposes, the Mekong may provide a decisive focal point for shared dialogue and future relations. Whether or not these relations provide positive dividends depends on the self-awareness of nations, and the impacts they desire to have on the region in which they reside.

Regional cooperation based around the environments of South and Southeast Asia have the potential to create a road map to future cooperation. The development of the Hindu-Kush Himalayas is overseen by a group of South and Central Asian nations (HKH countries), and the lower Mekong is, to an extent, regulated by the Mekong River Commission. The variable in this situation is whether Beijing will engage effectively in regional dialogues or exclude itself so that it may continue to act with impunity. At this current point in time, it appears as though China’s long standing ‘non-participation, non-discussion, non-recognition’ attitude is taking the lead. This strong-arming approach to regional issues misses the point of cooperation in this instance; the outcome of participation is not compromising the nation’s power, but rather seeking assurance of stability in its neighbourhood. Leveraging natural resources may reap dividends in the medium-term but it is inevitable that this will create a messy operating environment in the future. The Mekong can provide a gathering point by which nations can initiate dialogue and work towards mutually beneficial outcomes. That being said, if Beijing insists on asserting a ‘rights to territorial sovereignty’ mentality it may achieve hydro-hegemony at the cost of food security, human security, and a rapidly deteriorating regional security environment.

 

Bibliography

Articles:

  1. Biemans, C. Siderius, A.F. Lutz, S. Nepal, B. Ahmad, T. Hassan, W. von Bloh, R.R. Wijngaard, P. Wester, A.B. Shrestha & W.W. Immerzeel 2019. ‘Importance of Snow and Glacier Meltwater for Agriculture on the Indo-Gangetic Plain’. Nature Sustainability. Vol. 2. pp.594-601
  2. M. Kondolf, R. J. P. Schmitt, P. A. Carling, M. Goichot, M. Keskinen, M. E. Arias, S. Bizzi, A. Castelletti, T. A. Cochrane, S. E. Darby, M. Kummu, P. S. J. Minderhoud, D. Nguyen, H. T. Nguyen, N. T. Nguyen, C. Oeurng, J. Opperman, Z. Rubin, D. C. San, S. Schmeier & T. Wild 2022. ‘Save the Mekong From Drowning’. Science. vol. 376. pp.583-585
  3. Brochmann, N. P. Gleditsch 2012. ‘Shared Rivers and Conflict – A Reconsideration’. Political geography. vol. 31. pp.519-527 
  4. Hirsch 2016. ‘The Shifting regional Geopolitics of Mekong Dams’. Political Geography. vol. 51. pp.63-74

Phan, L 2016, ‘The Sambor Dam: How China’s Breach of International Law Will Affect the Future of the Mekong River Basin’, The Georgetown Environmental Law Review, vol.32, no. 105, p.107

Reports:

The Economist Group, Corteva Agriscience 2022. ‘Global Food Security Index 2022’. p.3-7 The Economist Group. London.

UNESCO, IUCN 2022. ‘World Heritage Glaciers: Sentinels of Climate Change’. p.18 UNESCO, Paris. IUCN, Gland.

Journalistic Sources:

Foreign Policy. ‘The Global Food Crisis is Here’, Jason Hickel, viewed 1st December. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/21/the-global-food-crisis-is-here/

Radio Free Asia. ‘Despite Seasonal Floods Now, Experts See Risk of Mekong Drying Up’, Dan Southerland, viewed 5th December. https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/mekong-threats-09132019155403.html

The Diplomat. ‘The Precarious State of the Mekong’, Nicholas Muller, viewed 5th December. https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/the-precarious-state-of-the-mekong/

NBC News. ‘Chinese Dams on Mekong River Endanger Fish Stocks, Livelihoods, Activists Say’, Keir Simmons, Rhoda Kwan, Nat Sumon & Jennifer Jett, viewed 5th December. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/chinese-dams-mekong-river-endanger-fish-stocks-livelihoods-activists-say-n1288720

Global Times. ‘A Glimpse of China’s largest Hydroelectric Project Along Lancang River: from being Responsible Neigbor ro Biodiversity Protection Vanguard’, Zhao Yusha & Cao Siqi in Pu’er, viewed 7th December. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202209/1276056.shtml

The Diplomat. ‘China’s Super Hydropower Dam and fears of Sino-Indian Water Wars’, Genevieve Donnellon-May, viewed 12th December https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/chinas-super-hydropower-dam-and-fears-of-sino-indian-water-wars/

Author: Thomas Robert Bartley (Intern at CESASS UGM)

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The Discrimination Towards Indigenous Women in Cultural Practices by Medyline Agnes Elias

The Discrimination Towards Indigenous Women in Cultural Practices by Medyline Agnes Elias

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948 by the international community,proved that human rights  were being accepted as universal norms that needed to be respected, protected, and promoted. The phrase in the UDHR “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” means that  everyone is equal in claiming their rights without distinction. This is supported by the first paragraph of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Actions preambular, where it recognizes human rights as a universal norm by stating that “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.” UDHR as a foundation of international treaties later became the foundation of other international human rights instruments including Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The existence of CEDAW in international law marks the importance of protection and promotion of women’s rights and gender equality between men and women, but in the process of gender equality to some women it is more challenging especially to women from minority communities, like indigenous women. Report from the United Nation (UN) special rapporteur on violence against women by Reem Alsalem stated that indigenous women and girls experienced systematic discrimination in indigenous and non-indigenous justice system (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2022). Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee in their General Comment No. 28, art. 3 highlight that the inequality of the enjoyment of rights by women is deeply embedded in tradition, history and culture including religious attitudes. 

UDHR ensures that everyone including indigenous women deserve equal rights, art. 1 and 7 of UDHR contain the principle of equality and non-discrimination, and in art. 2 of UDHR prohibits any kind of distinction on the fulfillment of human rights on the basis of sex. Prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex can also be found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art.2 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) art. 3. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women art. 3 stated that “Women are entitled to equal enjoyment and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, culture, civil or any other field..”, the enjoyment and protection of rights mentioned in art.3 including the right to equality, the right to be free from all forms of discrimination. 

Culture has two sides in human rights aspects, it can be the reason for human rights violation, but it can also protect human rights. A report of a special rapporteur, Farida Saheed on enjoyment of cultural rights of women on an equal basis with men in 2012 stated that there are many practices and norms in society that discriminate against women and it is justified by culture, religion and tradition. Leading experts also stated that social groups mostly suffered human rights violations in the name of culture (Celorio, 2022, pp. 320-231). 75 years since the universal norms of human rights were established and 42 years since CEDAW was instituted, these norms and rights are still not applicable to some indigenous communities because of their cultural beliefs. The reality of equality of human rights to women and men are different in the context of indigenous people. The importance of culture is often mentioned in the establishment of international law, but there is still a gray area of cultural practice and women’s rights. 

In Maluku there are the Nualu indigenous people, who are one of many examples of indigenous people in Indonesia. Nualu is an indigenous community located in Seram Island, Maluku. Women’s position in Nuaulu’s social system is considered lower than men, this is because in Nualu, women are considered dirty due to experiencing menstruation. Posune is a local culture from generation to generation in Nuaulu where women who are menstruating or about to give birth are sequestered in a house called Posune. Posune is located on the side or back of the main house. Posune is a forbidden area for men, if a man approaches or enters the Posune even though it is empty it is considered a sin and will be subject to sanctions in the form of being ostracized from the community and in the form of fines set by the customary head. Posune applies to unmarried women and married women. A married woman in the Nuaulu community when she is menstruating she is not allowed to have physical contact with her husband, on the other hand the woman is allowed to cook for her husband, but is not allowed to deliver it directly to her husband. Women in the social system of the Nuaulu community cannot become leaders even if they have menopause, women can only help but are not allowed to sit in positions. The Nuaulu customary system has been passed down from generation to generation, stipulating that women should not become leaders of men (Nina, 2012).

The culture and traditions of Nualu indigenous communities according to international human rights norms violates the rights of women and violates the principle of non-discrimination and universal human rights law. UDHR recognizes that everyone deserves equal rights, but the international community also recognizes indigenous people and their collective rights. The establishment of Indigenous and Tribal People Convention 1989 marked the recognition of indigenous people and tribunal people by the international community. These international instruments created antinomy on the fulfillment of women’s rights and gender equality because on the otherside international community recognize the universal human rights norms, but also recognize indigenous people traditions and culture. This antinomy departs from two perspectives in human rights law theories, namely universalism and cultural relativism. These two theories contradict each other so that there is debate among scholars about these two theories. 

The theory of universalism asserts that every human being has certain human rights because they were born as a human being and it made them inherit human rights. Universalism theory believes that human rights are something that cannot be taken away and are intended to protect human dignity. Universalism theory views that human rights are universal and so must be owned by everyone on the basis of equality is not a controversial matter. The theory of universalism can be found in UDHR (Donders, 2010, pp. 16). Unlike the view of universalism theory, the theory of cultural relativism sees that there is cultural diversity that exists everywhere in the world, including views about right and wrong. This view makes cultural relativism theory assume that universal human rights do not exist and the existence of cultural diversity means that an understanding of human rights can be interpreted differently (Donders, 2010, pp. 16).

 The debate between scholars about universalism and cultural relativism has divided the scholars into those who support universalism and those who deny universalism. The debate of these two theories started in the second UN World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. The debate has been going around on universal human rights norms as a western values that have been forced to non-western countries (Cerna, 1994, pp. 740). The debate of universalism and cultural relativism also depart from women’s rights (Higgins, 2017, pp. 97). Those who support cultural relativism argue that feminism is a product of western ideology and global feminism is a form of western imperialism. Cultural relativists argue that the conception of human rights by the universalist ignores the collective rights of indigenous and tribal people (Charters C, 2016, pp. 12). In Asia, the universality of human rights concepts face challenges because of private rights. These private rights related to religion, culture, the status of women, the right to marry and to divorce and to remarry, the protection of children, family planning (Cerna, 1994, pp. 744, 746). The conflict between universal human rights principles and cultural relativism often happen in Africa, Asian, and Islamic values. To address this differential issue scholars like Renteln, Donders, and Donelly proposed a way to reconcile the differences between universalism and cultural relativism which are flexibility in interpretation and implementation of rights, cross-cultural dialogue, and focusing on the process and the actors involved (Vleugel, 2020, pp. 41). 

To strengthen the scholars’ opinion on how to address the difference of those two theories, we have to consider the role states play in these issues. CEDAW contains the national effort the state should take to  maintain gender equality. Art 2(f) of CEDAW mentions for  states “to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women ” and art. 5(a) of CEDAW requires states to modify the social and cultural patterns that discriminate against women. Human Rights Committee (HRC) on general comment No. 28 stated that state have the obligation to ensure human rights enjoyment of all individuals and to ensure that states should to all the necessary steps these steps include “…removal of obstacles to the equal enjoyment of such rights, the education of the population and of State officials in human rights, and the adjustment of domestic legislation so as to give effect to the undertakings set forth in the Covenant. The State party must not only adopt measures of protection, but also positive measures in all areas so as to achieve the effective and equal empowerment of women. “.  In art. 3 of ICESCR also highlighted states obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women.  In general comment No. 28 paragraph 32 it might or might not giving us an answer to the debate between universalism and cultural relativism in the aspect of culture and indigenous women’s rights by stating that “The rights which persons belonging to minorities enjoy under article 27 of the Covenant in respect of their language, culture and religion do not authorize any State, group or person to violate the right to the equal enjoyment by women of any Covenant rights, including the right to equal protection of the law. “. 

In conclusion, states have the obligation to respect indigenous people culture, tradition, and their collective rights, but also states have the obligation to make an effort to protect indigenous women’s human rights from any violation and discrimination including from the practice of traditions and culture. States playing important rules in the nexus of women’s rights and culture. Universalism is important in protecting individual rights, and cultural relativism is important in protecting collective rights. Human rights practice shouldn’t overlook the fulfillment of individual and collective rights. States should take appropriate action in fulfillment of individual rights of indigenous women’s rights while respecting the collective rights of indigenous people. The protection of all individuals, including indigenous women’s human rights, depends on the state’s political will. The international human rights instruments will not be effective if there is no political will from states. 

 

REFERENCES

Book

Celorio, R. (2022). Women and International Human Rights in Modern Times: A Contemporary Casebook. Women and International Human Rights in Modern Times: A Contemporary Casebook (pp. 1–354). Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800889392.

Nina, Johan. (2012). Perempuan Nuaulu: Tradisionalisme dan Kultur Patriarki. Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.

Vleugel, V. (2020). Human Rights and Cultural Diversity. Between and Beyond Universalism and Cultural Relativism. In Culture in the State Reporting Procedure of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: How the HRC, the CESCR and the CEDAWCee use human rights as a sword to protect 

Journal

Cerna, C. M. (1994). Universality of human rights and cultural diversity: implementation of human rights in different socio-cultural contexts. Human Rights Quarterly, 16(4), 740–752. https://doi.org/10.2307/762567.

Charters, C. (2016). Universalism and Cultural Relativism in the Context of Indigenous Women’s Rights. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2887711.

Donders, Y. (2010). Do cultural diversity and human rights make a good match? International Social Science Journal, 61(199), 15–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2451.2010.01746.x.

Higgins, T. E. (2017). Anti-essentialism, relativism, and human rights. In Challenges in International Human Rights Law (Vol. 3, pp. 53–88). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315095905.

Internet

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner.  (2022) , End Violence Against Indigenous Women and Girls: UN Expert. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/end-violence-against-indigenous-women-and-girls-un-expert. Accessed March 28th 2023.

Legal Instruments

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Actions

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)

Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 28

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women

Author:

Medyline Agnes Elias (Intern at CESASS UGM)

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Can Indonesia Get Out of The Middle-income Trap: Policy Analysis

Can Indonesia Get Out of The Middle-income Trap: Policy Analysis

Introduction

With a population of 260 million people, Indonesia is the fourth largest country globally and one of the most dynamic economies in the global market. According to the World Bank, Indonesia is now included in the status of a middle-income country. The economy in the country is running smoothly, especially during the last decade following the economic contraction caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Due to its fairly rapid economic development, Indonesia has become a developing country and the first economic power in Southeast Asia. Its role in ASEAN continues to be important. Indonesia’s political and economic structure has changed over the years since its independence. In 1950, after the end of Dutch colonialism, economic and political development focused on the agricultural sector to realize a self-sufficient agricultural system by 1960. In the middle of 1970-1980, after the crude oil price fell, the Indonesian economy rapidly developed with urbanization and industrialization programs, for This Indonesia occurred as a consequence of the political change from crude oil exports to manufactured exports. 

After the Soeharto regime and the financial crisis in 1998-1999, Indonesia’s economy and politics progressed rapidly, and by 2004-2008 the GDP increased by 5%. During 2008-2009, the slowing down of the global economy did not have a high impact on the Indonesian economy, but GDP increased by 4% until the end of 2019. However, when the SARS-CoV-19 pandemic began to emerge, the Indonesian economy was negatively impacted. Indonesia is at significant risk of falling into the Middle Income Trap (MIT), and once in, it will not be easy to get out. According to the Coordinating Minister for the Economic, Airlangga Hartono, the Omnibus Law or the Job Creation Bill that the Joko Widodo 0.2 government recently passed could be a good weapon against MIT. This law is highly controversial; the effects of this reform will have a profound and lasting impact on the Indonesian economy that will last for decades. However, the Omnibus Law has been criticized. Public opinion and students for its negative impact on the rights of the environment, workers, and society.

The Middle Income Trap

The definition of Middle Income Trap or MIT is not universal; so far, no single general definition can explain its meaning. However, five main definitions can be used to understand the status of the included countries in MIT. The first is a non-empirical interpretation, based on the opinion of Gill and Kharas (2007), with MIT as a status where an economy has experienced a sharp decline in economic dynamism after successfully transitioning from low to middle-income status, presenting as stop-and-go growth, not steady long-term growth in productivity and income. Thus, it is intended to prevent the economy from moving to high levels of income.

Kenichi Ohno (2009) also expressed the same opinion that a developing country must follow several phases that assimilate. This method is known as “catch-up Industrialization” or “Breaking the Glass Ceiling” (Figure 1). The approach rests on structural and economic development in which the nature of the production structure and its context is on learning and international competitiveness issues. Furthermore, according to Ohno (2009), middle-income countries face slow growth, but the analytical framework for understanding slowing growth is different and the policy prescription.

Based on Ohno’s theory, Indonesia is now in stage 2. This stage is accompanied by increased accumulation and production so that the supply of domestic spare parts and components also begins to increase (Ohno 2009: 64). It must enter from FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and local supplies, which makes industry grow with a moderate increase in internal value, but production remains under foreign management. Another MIT interpretation is passing the income threshold, and this interpretation is the empirical interpretation of the income level as the threshold for MIT. Spence (2011) suggests that a threshold should be established through a rate of between USD 5,000 and USD 10,000 per capita income (KKB). He said this was because he saw that countries willing to transition to the level of developed countries were facing difficulties. According to the World Bank, Indonesia has entered into the middle to upper income (Table 1). This status was established following Joko Widodo’s political-economic plans during his first term. Jokowi plans to focus on infrastructure, especially bridges, highways, airports as set out in the ‘nawacita’ plan.

Tabel 1 : GNI  rates for Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia until 2020

Source : World Bank Data

Indonesia’s status is classified as middle income because the country’s GNP has increased to $4,050 per capita. According to the World Bank, when the country’s gross national income or GNI per capita is $4,046 -$12,535, the country can enter middle to upper-income status.  It can also be seen in table 1 by the World Bank. However, the path to becoming a developed country is still long and complicated, and there is a very high chance that Indonesia will be trapped in MIT. Based on the MIT theory through income threshold, middle-income countries find two threats; the first is a trap for capital income between $10,000 and $11,000, and the second the per-capita income between $15,000 and $ 16,000 trap (Eichengreen, Barry, Donghyng, Pak and Kwanho Shin, 2013).

Agen and Canuto (2012) suggest that the MIT analysis must pass the catch-up benchmark, which, in MIT analysis, takes data from the relative income threshold (Figure 1)

Graph 1

The threshold used to determine whether a country is stuck at MIT is between 5% and 45% of US GDP per capita. A study was conducted in 2012 to see how many countries have entered MIT and how many countries are high-income countries. However, this could become an example for Indonesia at present. According to Minister Bambang Brodjonegoro (2020), Indonesia will transition and enter the status of a high-income country by 2025 at the latest (Graphs 2 and 3).

Graph 2

Graph 3

Felipe, Abdon and Kumar (2012) said that countries trapped as MIT could be seen from the time threshold of 28 years for low, middle-income countries (KKB increases by 4.8% per year), and 14 years for high middle-income countries (KKB increase per year 3.5%). If these countries exceed the threshold number of years, they will be classified as trapped in MIT. However, Woo (2012) and Hawksworth (2014) conducted MIT analysis from another perspective. They analysed data from the Catch-Up Index (CUI). According to them, these countries could get stuck as MIT if they showed no inclination to meet global economic leaders from, for example, the US or China. CUI revealed that these countries enter into MIT as a result of dividing their income level: for example, based on the US income level, if Indonesias result is more than 55%, the country is classified as a high-income country, but if the result is 20% it will be called low income and or middle-income country. However, Hawksworth (2014) states that countries that want to leave MIT must follow several factors: economic stability, progress and social cohesion, technological advances, legal policies, institutional regulations, and sustainable development.

Based on this theory, it can be said that the countries included or trapped in MIT are developing countries (Pruchnik and Zowczak 2017: 18). The demographics are not favourable, especially considering the ages of the working class; if the workers are older, the saving rate will decrease compared to countries that have a younger working-class (Canning 2004, Ayiar 2013). Then, when the level of economic diversification is low, the country’s economic structure is important to continue the level towards high income. Middle-income economies must move up the value chain to maintain their high growth rates. Another consideration is inefficient financial markets, according to the World Economic Forum 2014, as they are negatively associated with a possible slowdown consisting of indicators such as availability of financial services, availability of venture capital and ease of access to loans. It also relates to inefficient raw infrastructure because the infrastructure with great quality is important in leaving MIT status (Agenor and Canuto 2012), especially based on the 2014 WEF (World Economic Forum), electricity, transportation, and communication infrastructure.

One factor that can assist a country leave MIT status is innovation. Low levels of innovation can cement a trapped state in MIT. Weak institutions can also be a problem for becoming a high-income country, especially if impacting the efficiency of the legal framework, protection of property rights, and the quality of government regulations which are important to encourage innovation and design activities.

Last but not least is an inefficient labour market and human capital. The country should make efficient use of the talents of workers, with flexibility in setting wages and hiring and firing practices.

How can Indonesia avoid being caught up in MIT? Can the Job Creation Law be a solution?

As explained above, Indonesia has become a high middle-income country. Based on the World Investment report 2020, FDI in Indonesia increased by 14% between 2018 and 2019 (figure 2).

Figure 2

Even though the Indonesian economy is developing and its status is rising, several factors can trap Indonesia in MIT status, such as high costs that can reach 60% for illegal transfers. WB has proven that the legal, economic framework is less effective than other Asian countries.

In addition, the business community generally considers the administration of justice and taxation and customs to be corrupt and arbitrary. Another factor is limited infrastructure, particularly the gap between Java and the outer or isolated islands, the unemployment rate, poverty and China’s high dependence on export commodities, thereby increasing the risk of Indonesia’s economic slowdown. Human capital in Indonesia is also one of the issues that can trap Indonesia in MIT status. Based on the latest data from the World Bank, the 2018 Human Capital Index in Indonesia is 0.53, meaning the average capacity of worker productivity is 53% of its full potential with access to education and the health system.

One of the “weapons” of the Indonesian government and Jokowi is 0.2 government is the approval of the Job Creation Law or the Omnibus Law. The Minister of Finance (Menkeu) said that she strongly agreed with the Law because, according to her, the Law will help State innovation, public creativity and various incentives to facilitate entrepreneurship in increasing income.  Teten Masduki, The Minister of Cooperatives and SMEs, said that this regulation would make it easier for business actors to benefit, especially those from Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises. The Omnibus Law attempts to shorten the hyper and heavy regulatory structure in Indonesia, which, until now, has been an overlapping legal issue which is a major problem economically as it slows down competitiveness nationally. For a country like Indonesia that wants to become a country with a high income by 2035, competitiveness is important because, with fast and uncomplicated competitiveness, the investment will be more attractive to Indonesia.

The World Bank (2018) says that because Indonesia has a multi-layered structure,  Indonesia is 73rd out of 190 countries and ranked 50th for competitiveness. It means that the bureaucracy in Indonesia has too many regulations, which slow down investment. Because of this problem, low human capital is increasing and also the infrastructure needs to be improved throughout Indonesia. The government has accepted the Omnibus Law because it aims to deal with vertical and horizontal public policy conflicts effectively and efficiently, harmonizing government policies at the central and regional levels, and simplifying a more integrated and effective licensing process. It is regulated into an integrated policy to break the convoluted bureaucratic chain and improve coordination between related agencies. In addition, the Omnibus Law can provide legal certainty and legal protection for policymakers.

Conclusion

The government must invest in Human Capital through education and the health and welfare system. Education is important to enable the level of knowledge and quality of society to be productive. Further, investment policies are less complicated so that foreign investors do not encounter bureaucratic difficulties. Indonesia is one of the countries with a very strong economy in Asia and the world, so the government should focus on following investment trends or trends followed by other countries, such as those focused on the green economy, infrastructure and technology. It is also important to focus on infrastructure for underdeveloped islands like North Sulawesi, Kalimantan and several areas in Sumatera. Anti-political corruption is a critical factor, as is political status in the country, which can also alter economic performance.

Indonesia has all the ingredients to become a high-income country in 2035-2040 but needs vigilance. Although the Omnibus Law is heavily criticized, it could be the last stage to move out of middle-income status, but only time will tell whether this will fail or succeed. It is necessary to focus on human capital and education, especially among the younger generation, while poverty levels must be reduced and infrastructure must be innovated, including in areas outside Java island. The bureaucracy must be facilitated, which may be facilitated by the Job Creation Law. This period is very important, as after Indonesia overcomes the COVID-19 outbreak and its economy recovers, the government needs to focus on improving domestic policies and infrastructure in under-developed areas and improve infrastructure in more developed areas such as Java.

Refrences

Agenor P., Catuno O. (2012) Middle-Income Growth Traps. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6210, The World Bank

Asia Development Bank -BAPPENAS Report (2019), Policies To support the development of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector during 2020-2024

Ayiar S, Duval R. Puy D., Wu Y., Zhang L ( 2013) Growth Slowdowns and the Middle-Income Trap IMF Working Paper WP/13/71, International Monetary Fund

Breuer, Luis E., Guajardo J., Kinda T. ( 2018), Realizing Indonesia Economic Potential, International Monetary Fund

Bukowski M., Helesiak A., Petru R., (2013) Konkurencyjna Polska 2020: Deregulacja i Innowacyjnosc. Warszawski Instytut Studiów Ekonomicznych ( WISE)

Camilla Homemo, (2019) Pengembangan modal manusia adalah kunci masa depan Indonesia, World Bank

Diemer A., Iammarino S. Rodriguez-Pose A., Storper M.; European Commission (2020), Falling Into the Middle-Income Trap? A study on the Risks for EU Regions to be Caught in a Middle-Income Trap, Final Report, LSE Consulting June 2020

Eichengreen, Barry, Donghyung, Pak and Shin Kwanho, (2013), Growth Slowdowns Redux: New Evidence on the Middle-Income Trap, NBER Working Paper, 18673, January

Faisal Basri, Gatot Arya Putra, (2016) Escaping the Middle Income Trap in Indonesia; An analysis of risks, remedies and national characteristics, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,Jakarat,  ISBN No: 978 602 8866 170 

Filipe J., Kumar U., Galope R., (2014) Middle-income Transitions: Trap or Myth? Asian Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series (421)

Gill I. Kharas H. (2007) An East Asain Renaissance, Ideas For Economic Growth, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank

Huang B., Morgan Peter J., Yoshino N. Avoiding the middle-income trap in Asia; The role of Trade, Manufacturing, and Finance (2018), Asian Development Bank Institute

Ricca A., Rachman Lestari I. C., (2020) Omnibus Law in Indonesia: Is That the Right Strategy? Pancasila University, Jakarta -Republic of Indonesia, Advances In Economics, Business and Management Research, Volume 140, International Conference on Law, Economics and Health (2020), Atlantis Press

NN., Omnibus Law : Solusi dan Terobosan Hukum, 2019, Indonesia.go

NN “RUU Omnibus Law : Omnibus Law; Solusi dan Terobosan Hukum, diakses melalui indonesia.go 

Ohno. K. (2009) The middle Income Trap, Implications for Industrialization Strategies in East Asia and Africa

Pruchnik K., Zowczak J. (2017), Middle-Income Trap: Review of the Conceptual Framework, Asia Development Bank (ABD) Institute, N 760 July 2017

Jawapos, 12/10/2020 Sri Mulyani: Omnibus Law Entaskan Indonesia dari Middle Income Trap

Woo W., Lu M., Sachs J., Chen Z., (2012) A New Economic Growth Engine for China Escaping the Middle Income Trap by Not Doing More of the Same, Imperial College Press.

World Investment report 2020; International Production Beyond the Pandemic, United Nations, New York

About the author:

Aniello Iannone is a candidate for Master of Political Science, Diponegoro University, and Junior analyst at the Institute of Analysis and International Relations (IARI).

 

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The Development of Jokowi's plan; why the Omnibus Law is good for the economy but a threat to civil rights in Indonesia

The Development of Jokowi’s plan; why the Omnibus Law is good for the economy but a threat to civil rights in Indonesia

Jokowi’s first development plan: infrastructure

Joko Widodo, better known as Jokowi, is in his second period of the presidency in Indonesia, which had, during his first period, he concentrated policy on the development of the Indonesian economy, especially through investment in the development of the development infrastructure (Hill and Negara 2019). Jokowi knows that infrastructure has been the “Achilles Heel” for developing countries like Indonesia, yet he focused on investment, health systems, and education during his second term. The last law on labour, the Omnibus law, was confirmed by the Jokowi administration last October during the COVID-19 pandemic. The new law will administer labour, environmental and investment regulation (Arifin 2021, Mahy 2021)

Nevertheless, what will be the cost-benefit of this decision?  Time will tell whether the Omnibus law will have a good effect or a dangerous effect. However, the people did not see any good in this new government choice, as evidenced by responses from the labour and student movements and academics. A strong infrastructure is essential for the effective functioning of the economy, particularly for reducing economic gaps in the region and reducing the poverty rate. (Firework World Economic Forum 2014).

Comparing the last year of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency with the start of the Jokowi period, the stark difference in approaches to economic development is clear. The first act that Jokowi did was to end the fuel subsidy, a subsidy that cost the Government 17.8 billion $  in 2014 and 4.8 billion $ in 2015, enough to divert to a start in promoting the infrastructure, improving the health system, and education ( Negara 2016). Indeed it was already clear that Jokowi planned to dedicate priority to infrastructure investment in the draft of the Medium Term National Development Plan or in Indonesian language RPJMN 2014-2019, where the Government hoped to increase 7 % GPD starting in 2016 (RPJMN report 2014). However, the anticipated GDP target was not reached.   Instead, the GDP of Indonesia has grown just 4 /5 % YoY during the slowdown of the global economy created by the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Nonetheless, Jokowi wanted Indonesia to be more economically independent, also not wanting Indonesia to fall behind other countries in Asia like India, China, and Vietnam where infrastructure was developing apace.  During his first semester, according to BAPESSAN analysis, no longer Europe and America, but Asia and the Pacific would be the centre of the world economy (Graphic 1).

 Graphic 1 demonstrated the prediction made by  BAPESSAN.

 Source : Bappenas, Oxford Economic Model 

Furthermore, Jokowi had understood that the national balance was insufficient without investment from foreign sources, based on investment in infrastructure. Jokowu also knew that, compared with other developing countries like Vietnam or China, Indonesia has a slow and complex bureaucratic system, especially for the legacy of foreign investment. These factors have combined to push the Government to create the controversial new Omnibus Law, cutting many bureaucratic knots in investment to the environment and labour laws.

In this scenario, Jokowi has understood that without foreign Investment, Indonesia cannot develop faster. After the end of Yudhoyono’s period and the start of Jokowi’s period, the budget that Indonesia needed for investment in infrastructure was 300 billion US$, yet the national public finance of Indonesia afforded just 20% of that amount (Deny Sidharta and Jared Heath 2014). According to Hall Hill and Negara (2019), one of the challenges in meeting Indonesia’s massive investment in infrastructure ambition is the weak tax system causing the government shortfalls in the public reserve. Therefore there were a few associated challenges that the Jokowi administration needed to resolve. The first was financing, and the others were land clarity, planning and projecting (Utomo 2017). In addition, Jokowi also faced another huge problem from entrenched local corruption festering through years of power decentralism after the end of the Suharto regime ( Nugroho 2020). In combination, tax inflation, excessive bureaucracy, and massive corruption have pressured Jokowi to accelerate the Omnibus Law to fix his plan to develop the nation’s economy.

 The Omnibus Law: worker, gender, environment rights

During the emergence of COVID-19 in Indonesia, the Jokowi Government and The House of Representatives accelerated the procedure for acceptance of the new Omnibus Law on labour in Indonesia to repair the bureaucracy that has, according to the President of Indonesia Joko Widodo (2020), slowed down investment in the country. The problems that made Jokowi create the Omnibus Law were hyper-regulation and bureaucratic knots (Anggraeni, Rachman 2020). According to the Regulatory Quality Index ranking, Indonesia is on the lowest level. Another problem is the decentralisation of power that has increased corruption at the local level (Johannes Nugroho 2020) and slowed down investment procedures. However, the effects on workers, gender, indigenous affairs and the environment are worrying.

Many scholars and NGOs have demonstrated their disappointment to the Government. The Omnibus Law is associated with profound adjustment to legislation that otherwise presents obstacles to investment, including the revision of 79 laws, reorganisation of legislation into 11 clusters and adjustments to more than 1000 articles, including those impacting labour law, social law, and national social security agency law (Amnesty International 2020). Many protections from the 2003 labour legislation have been deleted or modified. A new law on wages and job security is considered a threat, specifically because it does not consider inflation rates for the minimum wage. Therefore is revokes the set city district minimum wage. In practice, without inflation and cost living criteria for determining the minimum wage, poor areas like Papua are further weakened with not enough income to cover the daily cost of living (Usman Hamid 2020).

Another issue of concern is the relative security of the worker when signing a job contract. Under the Omnibus Law, employers cannot offer a permanent job contract but can provide a temporary contract for an indefinite period, meaning that the worker can more easily lose their job. The review of Labour Law presents a new threat with the possibility of performing “work for free”, meaning extra work that does not produce income for the worker. Moreover, article 93 (2) of the Labour Law does not allow for paid time off during menstruation, which is a significant violation of women’s rights.

Additionally, there is concern from environmental NGOs that the new law will increase deforestation in Indonesia (Madani 2020). There is a possibility that by 2056, 5 areas of Indonesia, Riau, Jambi, Sumatra, Bangka Belitung and Center Jawa, will lose their natural forest. Article 29,30,31 of the new law retains the AMDAL (environmental impact assessment requirements) but deletes the function of an independent committee composed of NGOs and activists for the environment.  The new law further supports deforestation to increase the palm oil plantation, a dangerous threat that the Government has endorsed with the amplification of the work.  It will probably negatively affect the local people who live in the areas that will be deforested, particularly art. 50 (2) sentences 12A and 17B prohibit farming in forestry areas and commercial activities in unregistered forests (Hamid and Hermawan 2020). How to report the NGO Human Rights Wacht (HRW), this is a violation of international norms, such as those expressed in the ICESCR and the UN declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (HRW 2020 )

On the one hand, the Omnibus Law was created by the Jokowi administration to push ahead with infrastructure and economic development through investment. The new Labour Law attempts to remove excessive bureaucratic administration and red tape relating to foreign investment regulation, liberalizing all foreign investor businesses in any sector, except for currently heavily regulated, banned or illegal industries such as weapons or illicit drugs (Shen and Siagian 2020). The Labour Law also brings tax reforms, an extremely complex issue because tax evasion is one of the highest in the region.  The Omnibus Law aims to reduce the tax to 20% for private companies and 17% for Indonesia-listed companies, while foreign workers will be exempt from paying personal income tax on income derived outside Indonesia (Shen and Siagian 2020). On the other hand, the Omnibus Law potentially damages workers’ rights, especially women and indigenous workers, so while investment may grow, the price will be paid by erosion in democracy and civil rights.

Refrences

Anggraeni,R, Rachman, C.I . (2020). Omnibus Law in Indonesia: Is That the Right Strategy?, Atlantis Press, Advances In Economic, Business and Management Research, volume 140 https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200513.038

Amnesty International. (2020) Commentary on the labor cluster of the Omnibus Bill on Job Creation ( RUU CIPTA KERJA)  Jakarta, Index: ASA 21/2879/2020

Amnesty International. (2020) Omnibus Bill on Job Creation Poses “Serious Threat” to Human Rights,

Amnesty International. (2020) Submission to United Nations committee on the elimination of discrimination against woman 

Arafin, S. (2021), Illiberal Tencencies in Indonesia Legislation:te case of the omnibus law on job creation. The Theory and Practive of legaslation Juornal, Vol 9 N.o 2 https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2021.1942374

Bland B. (2020), Man of Contradictions, Joko Widodo and the struggle to remake Indonesia, Lowy Institute, Penguin Random House Australia 

BAPPENAS, Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah 2014-2019

Breuer L.E,  Guajardo J, Kinda T. (2018)  Realizing Indonesia’s Economic Potential,  International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Emont J. (2016) Visionary or Cautious Reformer? Indonesia President Joko Widodo’s Two Years in Office https://time.com/4416354/indonesia-joko-jokowi-widodo-terrorism-lgbt-economy/ 

Firduas F. (2020) Indonesia Fear Democracy is the Next Pandemic Victim,  Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/04/indonesia-coronavirus-pandemic-democracy-omnibus-law/ 

Hamid. U., Ary (2020). Hermawan, Indonesia’s Omnibus Law is a bust for human rights, New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-omnibus-law-is-a-bust-for-human-rights/ 

Hill H, Negara S.D. (2019) ; The Indonesia Economy in Transition, Policy challenge is Jokowi era and beyond, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Human Rights Watch. (2020) Indonesia; New Law Hurts Workers, Indigenous Groups, Massive Omnibus Bill Passed Little Public Consultation. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/15/indonesia-new-law-hurts-workers-indigenous-groups 

HRW Ihanuddin, Krisiandi. (2020) Jokowi Ungkap Alasan RUU Cipta Kerja Dikebut di Tengah Pandemi, Kompas.com

Negara D. (2016 ) Indonesia’s Infrastructure Development Under The Jokowi Administration, Southeast Asian Affairs, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Nugroho J. (2020) Indonesia’s Omnibus Law won’t kill corruption , The Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-s-omnibus-law-won-t-kill-corruption 

 Madani (2020) . Tinjuan Risiko RUU CIPTA kerja terhadap hutan alam dan pencepain komitmen iklim Indonesia. https://madaniberkelanjutan.id/2020/05/06/tinjauan-risiko-ruu-cipta-kerja-terhadap-hutan-alam-dan-pencapaian-komitmen-iklim-indonesia  

Mahy,P. (2021) Indonesia ‘s Omnibs Law on Job Creation: Reducing labour Protections in a Time of Covid-19, Monash Business School, Monash University, Labour, Equality and Human Rights Research Gruop Working Paper N.o 23

Mighty Earth. (2020) Indonesia’s Omnibus Bill Approval Poses Dire Threat to Anti-Deforestation Efforts. https://www.mightyearth.org/2020/10/05/indonesias-omnibus-bill-approval-poses-dire-threat-to-anti-deforestation-efforts/  

Shen,J.,Siagian,C. (2020). Indonesia‘s Omnibus Law: A magic wand amidst a global pandemic? https://singaporeglobalnetwork.gov.sg/stories/business/indonesias-omnibus-law-a-magic-wand-amidst-a-global-pandemic/ 

Sidharta D, Jared Heath.  (2014) Building Effective Partnerships, Jakarta Post

World Economy Forum (2014) The Global Competence Index 2014-2015 www.weforum.org/gcr. 

Utomo, Wahyu. (2017). Tentang Pembangunan Infrastruktur di Indonesia. kppip.go.id. 

About the Author:

Aniello Iannone is a candidate for Master of Political Science, Diponegoro University, and Junior analyst at the  Institute of Analysis and International Relations (IARI).

 

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Inklusi Sosial di Era Digital (Social Inclusion in the Digital Age)

Inklusi Sosial di Era Digital (Social Inclusion in the Digital Age)

Abstrak

Pola relasi-relasi sosial yang tumbuh dan berkembang dalam kehidupan komunitas digital antara lain ditandai oleh kontak langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak orang (many-to-many communication), keterbukaan pandangan (ide), serta kebebasan berinteraksi. Uraian berikut memetakan perbedaan pandangan tentang dampak pola relasi-relasi tersebut terhadap inklusi sosial atau proses meningkatnya kapasitas akses komunitas pada sumber daya (resources), menguatnya partisipasi mereka dalam formulasi dan eksekusi keputusan publik, serta jalinan kerja sama di antara mereka dalam memanfaatkan dan menciptakan peluang. Di satu sisi, terdapat pandangan yang yakin (optimistic) bahwa relasi-relasi sosial tersebut memiliki dampak signifikan terhadap inklusi sosial karena mampu menghimpun perbendaharaan informasi yang dapat dipergunakan sebagai saluran akses pada sumber daya (resources), dapat dimanfaatkan sebagai pengetahuan (knowledge) untuk menciptakan dan memanfaatkan peluang, serta sebagai sarana mendorong partisipasi politik. Sementara itu, di sisi yang lain, terdapat pandangan yang justru meragukannya (skeptic) karena relasi-relasi sosial tersebut masih menghadapi kendala ketimpangan digital (digital divide) dan literasi sehingga tidak kondusif bagi upaya meningkatkan inklusi sosial.

Kata kunci: informasi, akses, inklusi, ketimpangan digital

Pendahuluan

Kemajuan teknologi informasi dan komunikasi telah mengubah berbagai tatanan kehidupan. Kita sekarang hidup di era digital atau era informasi, sebuah kehidupan yang diwarnai oleh relasi-relasi sosial yang melembagakan kontak secara langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak orang (many-to-many communication), keterbukaan pandangan (ide), dan kebebasan berinteraksi. Relasi-relasi sosial tersebut didukung oleh komputer (computer mediated) dengan beragam divice melalui e-mail, chat room, short message service, video call, telepon, teks, dan gambar, yang mampu menembus batas wilayah geografis, kelas, etnis, agama, gender, dan ideologi, juga membentuk. Di samping itu, keanggotaan komunitas digital bersifat sukarela (voluntary) dan terjalin atas dorongan atau motivasi pribadi (individuated) serta tidak mengenal hubungan hierarkis (berlapis). Berbeda dengan kehidupan komunitas nyata (real), relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas ini tidak terdapat dominasi individu atau kelompok atas individu atau kelompok lain. Identitas dalam komunitas ini juga bersifat fleksibel dan dibangun secara spontan. Identitas dalam komunitas ini tidak dibangun berdasarkan penghargaan status dan peran sebagaimana lazim terdapat dalam kehidupan komunitas nyata. Oleh karena itu, setiap anggota komunitas ini dalam waktu yang sama bisa menjadi follower (pengikut) sekaligus menjadi influencer (berpengaruh). Silih berganti peran semacam itu menciptakan kehidupan komunitas digital amat dinamis karena mereka senantiasa dituntut terus-menerus melakukan adaptasi dan negosiasi terhadap norma, nilai, dan pengetahuan baru (Boyd, 2007: 136).

Relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital yang melembagakan kontak langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak orang, keterbukaan pandangan (ide), serta kebebasan interaksi memproduksi informasi yang membentuk kultur unik, oleh Castel disebut culture of real-virtuality (Castel, 2001: 169–170). Di satu sisi, kultur tersebut berkarakter virtual (maya) karena nilai, norma, dan pengetahuan yang tumbuh di dalamnya dimanifestasikan melalui pesan-pesan audiovisual. Akan tetapi, di sisi lain, kultur tersebut juga berkarakter real (nyata) karena nilai, norma, dan pengetahuan tersebut dituangkan secara nyata dalam bentuk gambar, profil, suara, kata, dan sub-text. Informasi tersebut juga beredar luas dan kompleks, tidak hanya berbentuk deskripsi suatu kejadian yang dialami masyarakat nyata, tetapi juga berupa refleksi hasil-hasil diskusi, dialog, atau catatan kritis, bahkan refleksi protes keras yang berujung pada transaksi atau ketegangan politik.

Pertanyaannya yang menarik diajukan adalah sejauh mana sebenarnya relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital tersebut memiliki dampak signifikan terhadap inklusi sosial atau proses meningkatnya kapasitas akses komunitas terhadap sumber daya (resources), partisipasi mereka dalam formulasi dan eksekusi keputusan publik, serta kerja sama di antara mereka dalam memanfaatkan dan menciptakan peluang. Pertanyaan semacam ini relevan diajukan karena kontak langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak orang, keterbukaan pandangan (ide), dan kebebasan interaksi yang melembaga dalam komunitas digital dipercaya mampu meningkatkan akumulasi pengetahuan yang dapat dipergunakan untuk meningkatkan inklusi sosial. Jawaban atas pertanyaan tersebut terbelah ke dalam dua pandangan. Pandangan pertama percaya bahwa relasi-relasi sosial semacam itu memiliki efek yang signifikan terhadap inklusi sosial (optimistic in mind). Sebaliknya, pandangan kedua justru meragukannya (skeptic in mind). Perbedaan pandangan semacam itu sampai saat masih menjadi perdebatan (disputes) dalam berbagai diskusi dalam literatur sosiologi dan studi komunikasi. Uraian berikut bermaksud mengupas argumentasi di balik perbedaan pandangan yang bertolak belakang tersebut.

Pandangan optimistic

Seperti dinyatakan pada uraian terdahulu bahwa relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital melembagakan kontak langsung, komunikasi antar banyak orang, keterbukaan pandangan (ide), dan kebebasan berinteraksi sosial yang mampu menembus batas wilayah geografis, kelas, etnis, agama, gender, dan ideologi. Relasi-relasi sosial semacam itu memproduksi informasi yang tidak hanya bergulir dengan cepat dan menjangkau kalangan yang amat luas, tetapi juga dapat menciptakan stimulan dan mengundang tanggapan langsung (direct response) secara terbuka. Stimulan dan tanggapan tersebut beragam, bisa bersifat positif atau berupa dukungan (support) atau apresiasi, tetapi bisa juga bersifat negatif atau berupa catatan kritis dan protes yang dipicu oleh perlakukan yang diskriminatif. Stimulan dan respons tersebut bisa berkembang menjadi gerakan politik terutama ketika informasi yang bergulir ditengarai menciptakan kelompok tertentu menjadi marginal.

Bukankah catatan kritis dan protes secara langsung dan terbuka semacam itu lazim ditemukan pula dalam kehidupan komunitas nyata? Lalu, apa bedanya? Boleh jadi begitu. Namun, catatan kritis dan protes dalam komunitas digital dapat disampaikan secara langsung karena tidak membutuhkan perwakilan, artinya dapat menembus hambatan terjadinya mediasi yang dikendalikan oleh konspirasi politik. Di samping itu, dalam konteks demokrasi, penyampaian secara langsung dan menembus institusi mediasi juga diyakini mampu mempercepat proses pembentukan aspirasi dan opini sehingga berbagai bentuk kebijakan yang dirancang dan diimplementasikan menjadi lebih memperhatikan harapan publik. Dalam sistem demokrasi, pembentukan aspirasi dan opini juga dibutuhkan untuk menjaga kedaulatan (Dorota, 2006: 43–64).

Lazim pula dinyatakan bahwa relasi-relasi sosial dalam kehidupan komunitas digital memproduksi informasi yang mampu meningkatkan interactivity, yaitu proses berkembangnya tukar-menukar pengetahuan (Bucy and Tao, 2007; Tewksbury and Rittenber, 2012: 94–95). Pengetahuan tersebut bisa berupa kondisi aktual yang sedang menjadi keresahan masyarakat, tetapi bisa pula deskripsi tentang misi yang perlu diketahui publik, bahkan bisa pula terkait dengan efisiensi dan efektivitas kebijakan publik yang telah diimplementasikan. Oleh sebab itu, interactivity dapat berperan sebagai mimbar yang memberi fasilitas bertemunya berbagai macam kepentingan, serta menjadi tempat berdiskusi untuk menemukan alternatif solusi memecahkan masalah-masalah krusial. Peran interactivity semacam itu amat penting bagi berkembangnya inklusi sosial karena di samping melibatkan interaksi banyak kalangan, juga memiliki tautan dengan kepentingan publik.

Relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital juga diyakini berpengaruh signifikan terhadap berkembangnya modal sosial. Modal sosial adalah sumber daya (resources) yang dimiliki oleh kelompok atau komunitas dalam bentuk nilai-nilai dan norma yang melembagakan hubungan yang saling menguntungkan (reciprocal relationships) dan saling memberi atau menaruh kepercayaan (trust) yang dapat dikapitalisasi untuk kegiatan produktif. Hubungan antara pola relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital dan modal sosial adalah sebagai berikut. Pertama, karena pola relasi-relasi sosial tersebut mampu meningkatkan pengetahuan (knowledge) dari berbagai bersumber, maka bukan hanya penting dalam proses mengidentifikasi pelbagai masalah yang dihadapi (serta menemukan alternatif solusinya), tetapi juga dalam proses menciptakan dan memanfaatkan peluang. Kedua, pola relasi-relasi sosial tersebut juga menjadi modal membuat prakiraan langkah-langkah yang perlu dibangun supaya memperoleh hasil optimal. Ketiga, pola relasi-relasi sosial tersebut juga memiliki energi yang dapat dipergunakan untuk mobilisasi sumber daya (resources). Semakin banyak informasi yang diperoleh, semakin luas pengetahuan yang dimiliki, dan semakin kuat pula energi untuk melakukan mobilisasi sumber daya. Selanjutnya, relasi-relasi sosial tersebut dapat menanamkan dan menebarkan trust (nilai-nilai positif terhadap perkembangan), sekaligus mengembangkan mempertegas identitas sehingga mudah mengembangkan hubungan yang saling menghargai (recognition).

Pandangan skeptic

Pandangan optimistic yang yakin bahwa relasi-relasi sosial mampu meningkatkan inklusi sosial telah diragukan oleh sejumlah kalangan. Keraguan tersebut muncul karena masalah ketimpangan digital (digital divide) dan literasi. Digital divide adalah ketimpangan yang terjadi akibat perbedaan akses terhadap infrastruktur dan sistem pelayanan jaringan teknologi informasi dan komunikasi. Boleh jadi benar kontak langsung dan komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak orang (many-to-many communication) dalam komunitas digital mampu menembus batas-batas kelas, etnis, agama, gender, dan ideologi politik, sehingga pengguna dapat memperoleh pengetahuan dari berbagai macam sumber. Boleh jadi benar keterbukaan pandangan (ide) dan kebebasan interaksi sosial dalam komunitas digital tersebut mampu menciptakan peluang untuk menyampaikan catatan kritis, pengaduan, bahkan protes tanpa mengikuti sistem perwakilan. Akan tetapi, dalam realitasnya tidak setiap komunitas memiliki akses yang sama terhadap infrastruktur teknologi informasi dan komunikasi serta mampu memanfaatkan konten dan aplikasi. Observasi selama ini menunjukkan bahwa perbedaan wilayah, kelas, dan status berhubungan signifikan dengan akses dan literasi.

Kesenjangan digital tersebut terkait dengan difusi (penyebaran) infrastruktur jaringan teknologi informasi dan komunikasi serta ketersediaan device dan aplikasi dan konten internet (software). Tendensi ketimpangan digital (digital divide) ini terjadi karena pembangunan infrastruktur teknologi informasi dan komunikasi membutuhkan dana yang amat besar, dan pada umumnya diserahkan kepada swasta atau dalam skema kerja sama pemerintah-swasta (public-private partnership). Oleh karena itu, infrastruktur teknologi dan informasi cenderung dibangun di daerah-daerah yang secara ekonomi lebih mendatangkan keuntungan ekonomi. Implikasinya kemudian adalah terjadi gap atau kesenjangan akses pada infrastruktur informasi dan telekomunikasi. Kedua, terkait dengan status ekonomi pengguna (user). Supaya dapat menggunakan aplikasi dan konten (software) membutuhkan ketersediaan device yang tidak murah. Observasi selama ini juga menunjukkan bahwa aplikasi dan konten internet lebih banyak digunakan lapisan menengah dan atas (the have) terutama kategori usia muda, bekerja di sektor perdagangan, industri barang dan jasa, serta bermukim di daerah perkotaan. Tendensi demikian semakin mempertegas bahwa masalah kesenjangan digital (digital divide) cukup kompleks, maksudnya di samping terkait dengan potensi wilayah, juga terkait dengan sektor pekerjaan dan status sosial ekonomi.

Ketimpangan digital tersebut juga terkait dengan literasi, yaitu pengetahuan dan keterampilan (skill) menggunakan media digital untuk melakukan komunikasi melalui jaringan internet dalam rangka memenuhi berbagai kebutuhan. Dalam konteks ini literasi digital lebih terkait dengan kecakapan kognitif dan teknikal dan merupakan adaptasi terhadap perkembangan teknologi digital. Pengetahuan dan keterampilan tersebut biasanya diukur dari frekuensi dan intensitas: (1) menggunakan aplikasi dan konten internet dalam rangka mencari berbagai macam informasi yang relevan untuk melakukan perubahan, (2) mengirimkan informasi melalui aplikasi dan konten internet disertai dengan dialog tentang informasi tersebut, (3) berpartisipasi aktif dalam diskusi atau seminar yang diselenggarakan melalui internet, serta (4) membuat kreasi web page, terutama terkait dengan stimulan dan respons terhadap perkembangan isu-isu krusial. Observasi selama ini juga memperlihatkan bahwa mereka yang memiliki pengetahuan dan keterampilan semacam itu lebih banyak ditemukan di kalangan usia muda, bekerja di sektor perdagangan, industri barang dan jasa, dan bertempat tinggal di daerah perkotaan.

Seperti telah disampaikan dalam uraian terdahulu bahwa relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital yang ditandai dengan kontak langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak kalangan (many-to-many communication) mampu menembus batas wilayah geografis serta perbedaan kelas, ras, etnis, ideologi politik, umur, dan gender. Namun demikian, dalam realitasnya, relasi-relasi sosial acap kali terlalu bebas dan tidak mudah dikendalikan, dan potensial merusak nilai-nilai dan norma-norma yang telah disepakati secara kolektif. Relasi-relasi sosial semacam itu acap kali dipenuhi oleh ambiguitas dan inkonsistensi yang justru dapat menghambat kreativitas dan kegiatan ekonomi yang produktif. Oleh karena itu, asumsi bahwa relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital dapat mendorong berkembangnya modal sosial menjadi sukar menemukan bukti.

Selanjutnya, asumsi bahwa relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital mampu meningkatkan partisipasi politik dalam kenyataannya tidak mudah diwujudkan. Bahkan, tidak berlebihan apabila dinyatakan bahwa relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital potensial mengganggu stabilitas politik. Adapun bentuk gangguan terhadap stabilitas politik tersebut adalah sebagai berikut. Pertama, relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital dapat menciptakan delegitimasi sistem politik yang sudah menjadi kesepakatan publik. Strategi yang dilakukan adalah mengonstruksi sistem politik tersebut dengan mengembangkan wacana bahwa sarat konspirasi dan mengandung pelemahan hak-hak politik, sehingga harus ditolak. Relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital menjadi saluran yang efektif dalam proses penolakan tersebut. Kedua, kontak langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak kalangan (many-to-many communication), keterbukaan pandangan (ide,) dan kebebasan interaksi sosial menciptakan apa yang lazim disebut cyberbalkanization atau internet balkanization, yaitu segregasi di antara pengguna menjadi himpunan kelompok-kelompok kecil berbasis persamaan kepentingan politik. Kelompok-kelompok kecil ini sering kali membangun wacana dan pandangan sempit (a narrow-minded) dan sukar menerima wawasan yang dianggap tidak sesuai atau berlawanan dengan prinsip-prinsip yang melekat dalam kelompoknya. Dalam perkembangnya, relasi-relasi sosial  semacam itu memicu kebebasan berekspresi (free expression), menutup diri, dan pada gilirannya berujung pada melemahkan integritas dan kerja sama.

Ketiga, relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital acap kali menjadi lahan subur bagi berkembangnya buzzer politik. Dalam konotasi negatif, buzzer politik adalah pemilik akun menjalin hubungan dengan menggunakan aplikasi tertentu seperti facebook, twitter, istagram, whatshapp, flog melakukan propaganda atau menyerang rival politik. Buzzer politik melakukan kegiatan untuk memperoleh keuntungan finansial sehingga sering kali berperilaku oportunis atau berada di “dua kaki” pihak yang terlibat dalam kontestasi, kompetisi, atau konflik politik. Kegiatan buzzer bisa merusak stabilitas politik karena menciptakan wacana atau analisis yang menimbulkan rasa saling curiga atau saling tidak percaya. Itulah sebabnya acap kali dinyatakan bahwa relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital tidak hanya menciptakan respons dan stimulan yang serba spontan, ekspresif. dan emosional, tetapi juga memelihara epidemi irasionalitas.

Relasi-relasi sosial yang melembagakan kontak langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak orang (many-to-many communcation), keterbukaan pandangan (ide), dan kebebasan interaksi sosial dalam komunitas digital juga mendorong berkembangnya kapitalisme informasi (information capitalism), yaitu bisnis swasta yang memanfaatkan informasi sebagai modal utama dalam kegiatan ekonomi. Dalam konteks ini informasi tidak sekadar dipahami sebagai deskripsi peristiwa yang disebarkan untuk memperkaya perbendaharaan pengetahuan publik, tetapi lebih dari dikapitalisasi sebagai modal yang dimanfaatkan untuk kepentingan bisnis. Kapitalisme informasi mengembangkan pola bisnis yang berbeda dengan kapitalisme industrial. Dalam kapitalisme industrial, kegiatan bisnis terutama dalam bentuk mengolah barang dan jasa serta memanipulasi pasar. Pola bisnis kapitalisme informasi berbeda dengan kaptalisme industrial. Dalam kapitalisme industrial lokasi produksi, jaringan transportasi, penyimpanan atau pergudangan (storage), dan sistem distribusi (supply-chain) sangat diperlukan karena menjadi faktor-faktor yang determinan bagi keberhasilan bisnis, sedangkan dalam kapitalisme informasi, faktor-faktor tidak menjadi fokus kapitalisasi informasi. Kapitalisme informasi mengabaikan aglomerasi (wilayah) industri karena tidak lagi bergantung pada lokasi, jaringan transportasi, pergudangan, dan sistem distribusi. Dalam kapitalisme informasi, fasilitas produksi yang utama adalah akses pada teknologi informasi dan komunikasi serta jaringan internet. Implikasinya kemudian adalah kegiatan produksi dan distribusi hasil produksi dapat dikerjakan secara mandiri (tidak harus di pabrik). Tendensi demikian memicu berkembangnya out sourcing yang pada gilirannya menciptakan precariat atau kelas pekerja.

Semakin pesatnya perkembangan kapitalisme informasi ternyata tidak melemahkan kegiatan kapitalisme industrial. Sebaliknya, kapitalisme industrial justru semakin berkembang karena para kapitalis ternyata semakin canggih memanfaatkan dan menciptakan peluang yang hadir bersama relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital yang melembagakan kontak langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak kalangan, keterbukaan pandangan (ide), dan kebebasan interaksi. Dalam kehidupan nyata, kapitalisme industrial dan kapitalisme informasi acap kali bersinergi (working in gloves). Kegiatan kapitalisme industrial justru semakin besar, semakin leluasa bergerak dalam berbagai sektor usaha, dan semakin sistematis melakukan eksploitasi dan monopoli pasar. Implikasinya adalah pelaku usaha yang tergolong besar akan semakin besar, sedangkan pelaku usaha kecil dan menengah semakin terpuruk. Daya saing kelompok ini semakin rapuh karena kalah berkompetisi dan acap kali juga tidak memperoleh perlindungan yang memadai. Tendensi demikian menjadi alasan bagi sejumlah kalangan untuk meragukan (skeptic) asumsi bahwa relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital mampu meningkatkan inklusi sosial.

Catatan Penutup

Uraian yang telah disampaikan memaparkan argumentasi di balik perbedaan pandangan tentang hubungan antara relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital dan inklusi sosial. Inklusi sosial termanifestasi dalam tiga hal: (a) kapasitas komunitas akses terhadap sumber daya (resources), (b) partisipasi komunitas dalam proses formulasi dan eksekusi keputusan publik, dan (c) kerja sama komunitas dalam memanfaatkan dan menciptakan peluang. Argumentasi pandangan optimistic dibangun di atas asumsi sebagai berikut. Pertama, relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital tidak hanya menciptakan relasi-relasi sosial yang menembus batas wilayah geografis, kelas, etnis, agama, gender, dan ideologi, tetapi juga dapat meningkatkan perbendaharaan pengetahuan yang dapat dimanfaatkan menjadi energi untuk akses pada sumber daya (resources). Kedua, perbendaharaan pengetahuan yang diperoleh melalui relasi-relasi sosial komunitas digital tersebut tidak hanya berupa deskripsi suatu peristiwa, tetapi juga menciptakan perspektif yang dapat menjadi energi partisipasi politik. Ketiga, perspektif semacam itu selain dapat menjadi strategi menciptakan struktur hubungan sosial yang egaliter, juga dapat menjadi referensi membangun nilai-nilai yang melembagakan trust dan relasi-relasi saling menguntungkan (social relationships).

Sementara itu, argumentasi pandangan skeptic dikembangkan di atas asumsi sebagai berikut. Pertama, relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital masih belum merata atau masih berhadapan dengan tantangan digital divide (kesenjangan akses) dan literasi. Tendensi demikian terjadi terutama karena pembangunan teknologi informasi dan komunikasi diserahkan kepada pihak swasta, dan lebih mengutamakan dibangun di daerah-daerah yang secara ekonomis potensial memperoleh keuntungan ekonomi. Konsekuensinya adalah terjadi ketimpangan digital (digital divide). Kedua, relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital acap kali justru menumbuhkan berbagai macam propaganda dan intrik yang menyerang rival politik. Relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital tersebut gagal mendorong partisipasi politik, dan potensial menciptakan kegaduhan dan konflik politik. Ketiga, relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital menjadi lahan subur bagi berkembangnya kapitalisme informasi, yaitu kegiatan bisnis yang memberi ajang amat lebar kepada swasta. Kapitalisme informasi ditandai dengan melemahnya aglomerasi (kawasan) industri karena tidak lagi bergantung pada lokasi, jaringan transportasi, pergudangan, dan sistem distribusi. Kapitalisme informasi tersebut semakin melemahkan tatanan kesempatan kerja dan posisi tenaga kerja karena mereka masih tetap dihadapkan dengan eksploitasi dan manipulasi kegiatan kapitalisme industrial.

Pelajaran apakah yang dapat dipetik dari argumentasi di balik perbedaan pandangan tersebut? Pelajaran pertama, pada tataran teoretis, argumentasi yang dibangun baik oleh pandangan optimistic maupun pandangan skeptic sama-sama menempatkan kontak langsung, komunikasi yang melibatkan banyak orang (many-to-many communication), keterbukaan pandangan (ide) dan kebebasan interaksi sosial dalam komunitas digital melembagakan hubungan tanpa tergantung pada mediasi atau representasi (perwakilan). Kedua, dalam analisis tentang hubungan antara relasi-relasi sosial dalam komunitas digital sama-sama dikaitkan dengan pengetahuan (knowledge) yang mampu meningkatkan akses terhadap sumber daya (resources), partisipasi politik dan kegiatan menciptakan dan memanfaatkan peluang bisnis. Ketiga, upaya meningkatkan inklusi sosial melalui relasi-relasi sosial yang tumbuh dan berkembang dalam komunitas digital menghadapi kendala ketimpangan digital (digital dived) dan tingkat literasi pengguna.

Daftar Pustaka

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Boyd, Danah. (2007). “None of This to Real:  Identity and Participation in Friendster. Dalam Joe Karaganis (ed). Structure of Participation in Digital Culture. Columbia University Press.

Bucy, E.P and C.C. Tan. (2007). The mediated moderation model of interactivity. Media Psychology (9, pp. 647-672).

Burke, P.J and Stets J.F. (2000). Identity Theory. Oxford Universitsy Press.

Castells. (2001). Informationalism and the Network Society. Dalam The Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of the Information Age. London: Secker & Warbung.

Coleman, Stephen. (2008). Cutting out the middle man: from virtual representation to direct deliberation. Dalam Barry N. Hague and Brian D. Loader. Digital Democracy, Discourse and Decision Making in the Information Age (pp. 190-210). London: Routledge.

McDonald. (2008). The Benefits of Society Online: Civic Engagement. Dalam Karen Mossberger, Caroline J.Tolbert and Ramona Sl McNeal. Dalam Digital Citizenship, The Internet, Society, and Participatian (pp. 47-66). Cambridge: The MIT Press, Cambridge.

Pietrzy-Reeves, Dorota. (2006). Deliberative Democracy and Citizenship. Dalam Polish Political Science, Yearbook (vol. XXXV, pp. 43-64).

Tewksbury, David and Jason Rittenberg. (2012). News on The Internet, Information and Citizenship in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press.

 

Oleh : Sunyoto Usman (Pakar Pembangunan Sosial UGM)

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Indonesia Risks Factors in Terrorism

Indonesia Risks Factors in Terrorism

In Indonesia, terrorism is a threat that affects the nation’s social/political order and bring light to tensions existing in the country. Indonesia has the largest Muslim majority globally; however, Indonesia is a secular country adopting a liberal reform of Islam and accepting religious tolerance towards other minorities. However, terrorist groups have voiced their radical opinions on Indonesia’s secularism calling for the country to be an Islamic state and achieve these goals through violence. The Indonesian government has taken counter-measure to tackle these terrorist threats, but these measures are criticized by Human Rights Organisations (HRO). Because Indonesia has created many anti-terror repressive laws, violating the freedom of speech and the task force Densus 88 has broken many Human Rights Violations (HRV). This brings into question is terrorism the overall threat towards Indonesia, I would argue no but state that terrorism must be a risk that does possess a threat, however, cannot endanger Indonesia’s democratic institution. I would argue that Indonesia’s anti-terror laws are a danger to Indonesia’s democracy and Indonesia’s Counter-Terrorism (CT) agencies violate human rights laws (HRL). These are the overall threats that endanger Indonesia’s democracy and why treating terrorism as a risk can be approached with de-radicalization programs. I will explain how Indonesia can treat terrorism as a risk and not an existential threat like climate change and can be mitigated with soft-approach policies, and I will outline the dangers of the hard-approach undertaken by the Indonesian government.

Climate change, ethnic tensions, and inequality are challenging problems that Indonesia faces as a nation. Climate change has undoubtedly forced the Indonesian government to adopt new environmental laws but is yet to be taken seriously by the government (Kheng and Bhullar, 2011). The lack of governance to combat these growing inequalities and the existential threat of climate change has been met with criticism because the Indonesian government has failed to approach this with innovative policies. Instead, the government has taken a harder stance to combat terrorism, creating or reforming new laws enacted recently by the Indonesian parliament. The new laws have alarmed HRO and scholars criticizing the government for violating the freedom of speech and pushing the government into post-authoritarianism (Kusman and Istiqomah, 2021). Critics have argued that there can be other policies that Indonesia can adopt such as the de-radicalization program which requires serious reform because the threat of terrorism is continuing to evolve (Gindarsah and Priamarizki, 2021). Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other terrorist organizations are continuous threats, and the rise of lone-wolf terrorism will challenge Indonesia’s counter-terrorism agencies. The risk factors of terrorism in Indonesia are a present danger, but CT actions against terrorists are needed for a soft approach or hard approach to combat the risks involving the rising threat of terrorism in the country.

The war on terror is the defining factor that has pushed the Indonesian government to enact new repressive policies. Since the 2002 Bali bombing, the Indonesian parliament has rushed anti-terror laws to combat terrorism, but these laws have constrained individual rights in the country (Nakissa 2020). One of these laws, called “the Revisi Undang-Undang Anti-terrorism” allows the military to fight against terrorism (Haripin, Anindya, Priamarizki, 2020). The allowance of having the Indonesian military against the fight against terrorism is seen as an abuse of power because it pushes the nations back into the former post-authoritarian roots (Kusman and Istiqomah, 2021). The growing level of military force does have a negative consequence, for example, the United States (US) military war on terror is met with many criticisms among societies (Satana and Demirel-Pegg, 2020). Allowing the military to fight terrorists will create tension among the civilian population and could involve higher civilian casualties deaths if the military is called to eliminate terrorists in the region. One example was when the military was deployed to crush the terrorist organization called East Indonesia Mujahideen in the region called Poso, in central Sulawesi Indonesia (Nasrum, 2016). The military presence only created tension and fear amongst the civilian population because they were afraid and would be caught against the terrorist and military cross-fires (Nasrum, 2016). Allowing the military provides a challenge to Indonesia’s democratic institutions, which has weakened under President Widodo’s reign. President Widodo has taken great lengths to weaken the HRO and anti-corruption agencies in Indonesia (Kusman and Istiqomah 2021). The latest push by President Widodo to enact new counter-terrorism new laws is threatening Indonesia’s democracy because will these hard approaches to combat terrorism as risk be effective.

Indonesia’s hard-line approaches against terrorism are dangerous, especially allowing the military to fight terrorist groups, thus creating tension amongst the civilian population. Indonesia’s own CT task force called Detachment 88 or Densus 88 is being met with criticism and accusation from HRO (Arrobi 2018). Densus 88 task force was established in 2003 after the 2002 Bali bombing assisted by the United States and the Australian government and has successfully disrupted terrorist operations (Carnegie 2015 and Barton 2018). Densus 88 is one of the world’s best task force because Densus 88 has successfully prevented many terrorist threats in the country. Since 2002 Densus 88 has arrested 800 jihadists and thwarted 15 attacks in 2017, proving how robust and effective the task force has become (Arrobi 2018). Despite these successes, Densus 88 has violated human-rights laws by torturing suspected individuals, extra-judicial killings, tampering with evidence, and interfering with defence lawyers for easier convictions (Nakissa 2020). Indonesia’s own National HRO Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Komnas HAM) has admitted to Densus 88 “excessive use of force” (Nakissa 2020). Torture tactics conducted by Densus 88 is bound to have negative consequences because many reports and evidence shows that torture is the worst interrogation method conducted (Rejali 2007). Individuals are more likely to lie to get out of torture and only radicalize their supporters to commit attacks against the state (Rejali 2007). Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict THE RE-EMERGENCE OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (2017) reports explained the death of a terrorist suspect Siyono who died in police custody. Siyono’s death from the announcement was met with outrage amongst the civilian population and called for greater accountability for Densus 88. The hard-approach measures taken to combat terrorism in Indonesia has only provided more threats in the country because the violation of HR has only angered the civilian population. It is why a much broader scope of Indonesia’s de-radicalization program can mitigate the risk associated with terrorism.

A soft-approach towards terrorism is needed with Indonesia’s de-radicalization program, which requires policies and reform (Gindarsah and Priamarizki 2021). In Indonesia, terrorism is evolving, and terrorist organizations are starting to use social media to bolster their support and increase their recruitments ( Habulan et al. 2018). Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) the organization involved with 12 terrorist attacks, including police officers’ targeting, is starting to use social media as a propaganda tool (Habulan et al. 2018). Indonesia’s national counter-terrorism agency (BNPT) will need to counter these messages with good prison sentences and education reform to counter-terrorism. De-radicalization programs have been shown to work in Indonesia, individuals have realized that the action they have committed is wrong and speak out against inciting violence. The book “why terrorist quit” by Julie Chernov Hwang (2018) had shown interview reports where the individual questioned his action when he bombed the church killing innocent civilians. Evidence shows that even installing Muslim leaders to shut down radical preachers can shut hate messages and change the individual perspective (IPAC 2014). Prison and Education reform is the best soft approach needed to boost Indonesia’s de-radicalization program. Evidence shows that individuals can change their perspective when re-educated and shown Islam’s correct teaching (Hwang 2018).

The risk involving terrorism is continuing to dominate Indonesia’s social and political order, and with the rise of social media, terrorists are starting to change their tactics and adapt their propaganda. Indonesia’s hard-approach towards terrorism will undoubtedly create more risks testing Indonesia’s democracy, which is already under threat. President Widodo pushing the parliament to introduce new CT laws violates the freedom of speech in the country. Repressive anti-terror laws approving the military to engage against terrorist groups will create tension amongst civilians and push Indonesia back towards the nation’s post-authoritarian roots. Densus 88 have already come under scrutiny for breaking human rights laws and has received backlash from the public. Indonesia’s government and the (BNPT) must approach terrorism as a risk factor which can involve soft-approach policies. De-radicalization programs have proven to change former terrorist perspective and can introduce these individuals back into society. Terrorism treated as a risk can move toward reform of education and good prison sentences instead of the Indonesian government’s draconian policies. Terrorism if treated as a risk factor proves that the threats are there, but Indonesia’s policies do not have to be affected by terrorism, but a more civilian,  human right, and justice approach can combat the threat of terrorism in Indonesia.

About the author:

Dave Pereira was a participant of Development Studies Professional Practicum (DSPP) Virtual Internship at ACICIS Indonesia. As part of this program, he also conducted an online internship in PSSAT (Pusat Studi Sosial Asia Tenggara or CESASS (Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies) UGM on January 8th – February 12th, 2021.

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Radical Islam, The Relationship between Politics, Security and Terrorism in Indonesia

Radical Islam, The Relationship between Politics, Security and Terrorism in Indonesia

Terrorism is often an act of violence, or threat to act, that is politically or religiously charged. A true worldwide definition of terrorism does not currently exist, yet there are specific characteristics that we can link to the concept. One of the struggles of understanding terrorism in academic debates stems from the lack of a solid definition. It has been argued by many scholars that such a definition cannot ever exist (Jackson et al. 2011). Difficulties scholars have agreeing on a definition of terrorism come from it being contextually determined, and definitions in this area can often include political bias. Over-generalized definitions are mostly what we have been left with around the world. Indonesia’s Anti-terrorism Law (ATL) of 2002, gives a description of terrorism. This law does not define terrorism in any strict sense but instead claims that the crime of terrorism can be any act that fulfils elements of the crime under this law. There are critical terms left undefined and therefore subjective to various interpretations, such as ‘widespread atmosphere of terror or fear’. Widespread is not defined to a radius, neither is fear define to a degree. The vague terms included in this description has been criticized for being applicable to various cases that may not involve terrorism (Butt, 2008). A lecturer at Murdoch University, Dr Ian Wilson (2020), argues that there are no terrorist organizations, there are only political groups that use terrorism as a tactic. This is important to understanding the link between terrorism and politics in Indonesia. The motives of these groups are politically charged and stem from a discomfort with Indonesian democracy.

There was much debate about the security of Indonesia being threatened with the release of Abu Baker Ba’asyir early this year. Jones (2019) argues that his release is unlikely to suddenly increase the risk of terrorism in Indonesia. However, he is still very much able to preach radical ideas and is under no restrictions from doing so. In 2014, while in prison, Ba’asyir pleaded his allegiance to the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. According to Jones (2019), President Joko Widodo’s decision to release him violated standard regulation when Ba’asyir did not need to sign a loyalty pledge to the government. ‘It would seem to violate Regulation 99 of 2012 from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, which makes the early release for certain categories of offenders, including convicted terrorists, contingent on their willingness to sign a written loyalty oath to the Indonesian government’ (Yulisman, 2019). Abu Baker Ba’asyir was exempt from signing. This shows a political weakness in the fight against terrorism. While the security of Indonesia is seemingly not threatened by his release, the political leaders have undermined the regulations that actively contribute to counterterrorism measures through de-radicalization.

Radical political groups and terrorism acts undermine the political sphere and create security issues in Indonesia. The continued pressure from political Islam has been a developing issue in Indonesia for many years. Radical Islamist groups continue to create fear through terror tactics around Indonesia and political Islam threatens Indonesia’s democracy. The Indonesian government has limitations, and they have fallen short when it comes to dealing with terrorism. Indonesia was a presentation of democratic transition for many years, especially for countries like them with large Muslim populations. Liberalism and perhaps even tolerance in Indonesia can be seen to be under threat. Tim Lindsey in his article ‘Retreat from Democracy: The Rise of Islam and the Challenge for Indonesia’ (2018), argues that liberal democracy is in contest with Muslim conservatives. He points out the paradox that the voices of tolerance which sought to present Indonesia as a Muslim Democracy now face opposition from Muslim conservative intolerance empowered by that very democracy.

Within the Muslim community in Indonesia there is a battle between moderates and conservatives over the essence of Islam and its presence in political and social structures, institutions, and culture. As Shira Loewenberg (2018) argues, there are two very different futures for Indonesia that are fought for by the two sides. The moderate side fights for Indonesia’s democracy, and religious freedom, while the conservative side fights for an Islamic state, governed under Islamic law and opposed to democracy. However, most scholars agree that it is unlikely Indonesia will formally be an Islamic state anytime soon.

In Vedi R. Hadiz’s ‘Towards a Sociological Understanding of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia’ (2008), he discusses radical Islam as being deeply rooted in contemporary world order. Hadiz makes comparisons between the fear of political islam, with the growing discomfort surrounding the state of democracy in Indonesia. In the past, organized Islam has been a major source of opposition to democracy, and appointed leaders. This pressure continues to threaten democracy, while being given a platform to speak by that very democracy. Blasphemy laws in Indonesia are just one example of political Islam being put at an advantage by democracy (Connelly & Busch, 2017).  The jailing of Ahok, the Jakarta governor, in 2017, demonstrates the problem. President Joko Widodo and his government struggled to respond effectively. They can be argued to have been intimidated by the attacks on the governor and the calls for ending Jokowi’s presidency as well. The governor lost his election and was jailed under blasphemy laws. Islamic values are imposed on laws and norms gradually, such as increasing limitations on free speech, restrictions on clothing and sexuality, as well as the banning of alcohol. As a model for this approach many look to Malaysia (Lindsey, 2018).

The relationship between politics, security and terrorism in Indonesia is grounded in the largely Muslim population, and is threatened by extremists. Politics, including laws and norms, can be seen to be continually being influenced by conservative Islam. Threats from terrorism are very real, and undermine the security attempts made by the Indonesian government.

References

Butt, S. (2008). Anti-Terrorism Law and Criminal Process in Indonesia. ARC Federation Fellowship ‘Islam And Modernity: Syari’ah, Terrorism and Governance in South-East Asia’. Retrieved from https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1546327/AntiTerrorismLawandProcessInIndonesia2.pdf

Connelly, A., & Busch, M. (2017). Indonesian democracy: Down, but not out. Retrieved 28 January 2021, from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesian-democracy-down-not-out

Jackson, Richard, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen Smyth. 2011. “Conceptualizing Terrorism”. In Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, 1st ed., 99-121. Palgrave Macmillan. https://content.talisaspire.com/murdoch/bundles/5bfcf2e6540a2630f54558e4.

Jones, S. (2021). Indonesia: releasing Abu Bakar Ba’asyir wrong on all counts. Retrieved 12 January 2021, from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-releasing-abu-bakar-ba-asyir-wrong-all-counts

Lindsey, T. (2018). Retreat from democracy? The rise of Islam and the challenge for Indonesia. Australian Foreign Affairs, (3), 69-92.

Loewenberg, S. (2018). Threats to Indonesia’s Democracy. Retrieved 21 January 2021, from https://www.ajc.org/news/threats-to-indonesias-democracy

Vedi R. Hadiz (2008) Towards a Sociological Understanding of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38:4, 638-647, DOI: 10.1080/00472330802311795

Wilson, Ian. “Introducing the unit & the challenges of conceptualizing terrorism” [lecture]. In Pol 234: Terrorism in a Globalized World, Murdoch University, 27 February 2020.

Yulisman, L. (2019). Indonesia president orders review of planned release of radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir. Retrieved 13 January 2021, from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-president-orders-review-of-planned-release-of-radical-cleric-abu-bakar-bashir

About the author:

Megan Connelly was a participant of Development Studies Professional Practicum (DSPP) Virtual Internship at ACICIS Indonesia. As part of this program, she also conducted an online internship in PSSAT (Pusat Studi Sosial Asia Tenggara or CESASS (Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies) UGM on January 8th – February 12th, 2021.

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Wives for sale! Exports of the Vietnamese Bride Industry

Wives for sale! Exports of the Vietnamese Bride Industry

When it comes to Vietnamese exports, the first item that comes to mind for most people might be Vietnamese coffee. Indeed, this famous good lies among the many items exported out of Vietnam which has led to the establishment of these marketable industries. However, this article will not be exploring these conventional exports but will focus on a lesser-examined good instead- the Vietnamese bride.

This ‘economic good’ of the Vietnamese bride can be located within the larger phenomenon of the mail order bride industry. As defined by Sarker, Cakraborty, Tansuhaj, Mulder and Dogerlioglu-Demir (2013), this industry can be seen through “international marriage brokering agencies as mail order bride services”. In highlighting the centrality of brokering agencies to the market, this definition helps distinguish a bride that is specifically sold as an international ‘product’ against her fellow compatriot who marries overseas, outside of the system. Hence, this serves to demarcate and economise the human bride into a commercial good, which is arguably problematic due to its dehumanising undertones. However, for the purpose of understanding how this industry can be perceived using an economic lens of analysis, these terms will be used in the course of examination below.

Within the mail-order bride industry, countries are categorised as ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ or exporters and importers. Developing countries, such as those in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, tend to be grouped as exporting countries while developed ones such as the U.S., Western Europe and East Asia are seen as importers (Lloyd, 2000). These circumstances are shaped by demand and supply factors for brides. Women facing issues of poverty in their developing hometowns become the supply while men from wealthier nations and purchasing power fuel the demand. For the brides-to-be, such marriages are a means for them to escape comparatively poor living situations with a hope to remit money gained from their new life to their families back at home. The motivation for men in these importing countries would then be to meet their needs of a wife through monetary means for reasons which do not allow them to find one in their own country (Yakushko & Rajan, 2017).

One exporting country which has become more active within this industry in recent years is the republic of Vietnam. This is due in part to the demand factor of East Asia’s economic rise which increases purchasing power and demand for the service, as well as the associating problems of changing marriage norms with more financially independent women in the region (Kim & Shin, 2008). The popularity of Vietnamese brides, in particular with these East Asian countries, can be observed in the lower cultural barriers to bridge these international counterparts. This can be seen in similarities of religion, family values and even their physique which arguably inclines them towards an East Asian model. As such, this accounts for the prevalence of Vietnam brides over mail-order brides from other destinations within the East Asian region. (Kim, 2012).

Due to the pronounced financial benefit associated with these marriages, there is a prevalent perspective that wives only seek to gain from such an arrangement. However, this article would like to highlight that this is not entirely the case. Beyond the allure of economic security lies challenges which these brides have to navigate through on their own in a foreign land after the marriage. These issues include social exclusion, higher risks of facing physical abuse within the marriage, and the threat of human trafficking when examined across the different ‘import’ countries which these brides get sent to.

In a study by Kim (2012) on Vietnamese brides in South Korea, it was found that the phenomena of social exclusion were widely faced by these ladies after migrating for their marriage. Exclusion arises from the differences that exist between the bride and the Korean society despite the overarching similarities they share compared to mail-order brides from other countries. This is especially distinct in the area of communication because the Korean society is arguably perceived to be relatively homogenous and defined by the Korean language. Difficulty in picking up the language by these brides result in them being demarcated as ‘others’ by the larger society. As a result of this, they become excluded at a societal level and the lack of acceptance makes the facilitation of integration for these brides to be difficult in finding emotional stability in their new homes.

A closer look at brides ‘exported’ to America reveal the problem of physical abuse as highlighted by Morash, Bui, Zhang, & Holtfreter (2007).  A prevalence of such abuse being faced by these brides has been argued to stem from the demographics of men who tend to engage in this industry. These risk factors are seen in the larger percentage of men who have backgrounds with a history of violence that seek wives using these means. The decision to turn to women overseas is a response to the struggle in finding local women to marry due to their backgrounds. The Vietnamese bride becomes highly prized among this demographic due to their marketing as ‘subservient’ by matchmaking companies, which feeds into the notion that they are easier to control and thus appealing to such men. This however leaves the bride at the mercy of physically abusive spouses which places them in a vulnerable position.

When examined in the context of these brides in China, Barabantseva (2015) paints an even more alarming problem of trafficking that they are exposed to. Some of these brides are kidnapped, misled and sold into the market by traffickers who attempt to profit off the industry by doing so illegally instead of through official brokering agencies. This is an issue for Vietnamese brides to China in particular because of the close geographical proximity of the two where they share a common border. This is facilitated by traffickers who falsely promise Vietnamese women job opportunities in China, bringing them across the border or forcibly kidnapping them to be sold to Chinese men in need of a wife. This practice continues in recent times as reported by various news sources even in 2019 (Ng).

In conclusion, this industry is complex, dynamic and not without its benefits and challenges (Thai, 2008). From understanding the economic framework of how marriage can be commodified and facilitated in a cross-border process from Southeast Asia to the region beyond it, as well as the challenges which these brides face within this exchange, there is much which can be observed and commented on. It is hoped that even as ‘importing’ countries enjoy the benefit of being able to engage in these services, measures would be put in place to safeguard the lives of these Vietnamese brides who arrive on their shores not just an economic good but as a human.

 

References

Barabantseva, E. (2015). When borders lie within: Ethnic marriages and illegality on the Sino‐Vietnamese border. International Political Sociology, 9(4), 352-368. doi:10.1111/ips.12102

Kim, H. (2012). Marriage migration between South Korea and Vietnam: A gender perspective. Asian Perspective, 36(3), 531-563. doi:10.1353/apr.2012.0020

Kim, S., & Shin, Y. (2008). Immigrant brides in the Korean rural farming sector: Social exclusion and policy responses. Korea Observer, 39(1), 1.

Lloyd, K. A. (2000). Wives for sale: The modern international mail-order bride industry. Northwestern. Journal of International Law & Business, 20(2), 341.

Morash, M., Bui, H., Zhang, Y., & Holtfreter, K. (2007). Risk factors for abusive relationships: A study of Vietnamese American immigrant women. Violence Against Women, 13(7), 653-675. doi:10.1177/1077801207302044

Ng, D. (2019). Raped, beaten and sold in China: Vietnam’s kidnapped young brides. Channel News Asia. [online] Available at: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/cnainsider/vietnam-kidnapped-brides-trafficking-china-wives-11777162 [Accessed 29 Oct. 2019].

Sarker, S., Chakraborty, S., Tansuhaj, P. S., Mulder, M., & Dogerlioglu-Demir, K. (2013). The “mail-order-bride” (MOB) phenomenon in the cyberworld: An interpretive investigation. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems (TMIS), 4(3), 1-36. doi:10.1145/2524263

Thai, H. C. (2008). For better or for worse: Vietnamese international marriages in the new global economy. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press.

Yakushko, O., & Rajan, I. (2017). Global love for sale: Divergence and convergence of human trafficking with “mail order brides” and international arranged marriage phenomena. Women & Therapy, 40(1-2), 190-206. doi:10.1080/02703149.2016.1213605

Article was written by Esther Ng Shu Shan National University of Singapore.

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The Domino Effect and the Web of Connections Between Tourist Sites in Indonesia

The Domino Effect and the Web of Connections Between Tourist Sites in Indonesia

On the 1st-4th of April 2019, I attended the MMAT workshop (Mengajar & Meneliti Asia Tenggara or “Understanding Changes in Southeast Asia”). The workshop aimed to equip the participants with a deeper understanding of Southeast Asia as well as research skills and experience. A part of the workshop was to do fieldwork at one of three locations, and I was in the group that did our fieldwork at Sosrowijayan. We were asked to observe and do interviews to find out more about the area in accordance to our area of study. As an anthropologist, I looked at the state of the society, and the practices of the people.

In this essay, I would like to explore the concept of the “domino effect” or interrelatedness through the tourism industry located in Sosrowijayan; its implications and significance; and its resultant impact and consequences for the area and its community of residents. From my observations, I would like to suggest that a domino effect can be observed, where it has affected the economic activities and fortunes of the people living and doing business in Sosrowijayan. This has further implications for the lives and identities of its residents.

Sosrowijayan is located near Yogyakarta Station or Stasiun Tugu, a railway station located close to the centre of the city of Yogyakarta. As my group and I walked around Sosrowijayan, it was clear that the area was created primarily because of its location and the resultant demand for accommodation from travellers. Sosrowijayan is mostly filled with losmen, hotels, restaurants, tour agencies, and other services catering to the types of people that visit the area. These indicate the importance of the need for tourism-related demand, and it is not surprising why the area is heavily dependent on tourist numbers.

After the Bali bombings occurred in 2002 and 2005, this negatively affected the tourist sentiments about Bali, and in turn, affected the tourist arrivals to Indonesia in general, which includes Sosrowijayan in Yogyakarta. The tourist arrivals to the area dropped, which greatly affected the businesses in the area. With a decrease in the number of regular tourist arrivals to Indonesia, this increases the difficulty of sustaining an already seasonal economic activity, since most tourist arrivals (usually from Western countries) usually come during the summer (middle of the year) or around the Christmas holiday period.

This is where the domino effect comes into play because we were told by an owner of one of the resturants and losmen in Gang 2, Sosrowijayan, in a conversation with him, that the tourists usually come to Indonesia on a tour package. These tour packages usually bring them to Bali first and then Yogyakarta, so when the Bali bombings happened, the tour groups stopped coming because the package would include both. Hence, indirectly, the owner of the restaurant and losmen and Sosrowijayan in general are reliant on these tourist packages. This reveals an interconnectedness that exists between the various popular tourist sites in Indonesia, where even though they may not geographically distant from each other and might not be conceived as connected in any way by the locals, tour agencies have created a connected that these businesses had apparently depended on, and need to sustain their business.

This comment reveals the importance of the domino effect, since its consequences also affect the society there in other ways; not just economically, but also in terms of social positioning and feeling of relevance, since their identity as an area, as an “international village” is based on that idea that travellers will stay at that area. So what will happen to that identity when there are little tourists or when the tourists are gone?

While my group and I walked around Sosrowijayan, we visited a bookstore-cum-gift shop located in Gang 1. We talked to the owner/manager of the store she commented that the shop would received a lot of visits and business from the international tourists when there were still many coming to Yogyakarta before the Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005. However, now the store’s relevance has changed, since more students and locals patronise the store and buy the books there because it is cheaper than other bookstores like Kinokuniya, since the books are second hand and are from the owner’s brother’s personal collection.

This is perhaps indicative of a changing relevance of Sosrowijayan, where it is not just an international village but a local “kampung” or a local village. Perhaps it now presents an international front for the local people, which casts doubt on whether the area is truly “international”.

This could be a new form of the concept of “international”, where the meaning of the concept is pertinent not to the outsider but to the insider. An example that comes to mind is the mall Terminal 21 in Bangkok, where each of its floors are zones designed according to the themes of different cities in different regions of the world. While the mall is situated in a tourist area and located near many hotels, it seems like such a design was not just meant for the tourists, who may actually originate from those cities or regions, but it seems to be designed for locals who wish to experience a different region without travelling out of the country, or while they go about the mundane activity of visiting the mall. Whatever the case might be, at the end of the day, such a theme is an effective way to attract visitors to the mall and create interest in them while they are there.

It is worth noting that Sosrowijayan does not have much relevance to Indonesia, as shown in a comment by the restaurant/losmen owner about how there are not many locals that stay there, since they would rather stay at their friend’s house or kos, instead of playing for a room at the losmen.

There are also other problems that face the area including the difficulties of digitalisation, the disruption presented by online businesses, and the construction of a hotel in the area. While digitalisation is the future, its effects are not necessarily positive, since most of the existing older losmen do not use digital infrastructure like credit card payments or online bookings. Furthermore, since there are more online businesses are now present in the area like Airy Rooms, tourists would usually prefer to stay in these more modern accommodations that the traditional and older losmen. Thus, it is important for these losmen, these businesses that are not digital, to retain their relevance to the modern tourist who prefers obtaining his accommodations through digital means. Lastly, the future presence of a big hotel in the area also presents a challenge for the community, since it literally towers over all the tiny losmen and smaller hotels and represents the advance of a “modern” form of tourist accommodation. It is not certain how its presence will affect the community and businesses in Sosrowijayan.

A sidenote, I think that it is worth considering the reasons why losmen are not all going digital, since examining the reasons could reveal other forces at play in the state of the community in Sosrowijayan that affects tourism activities. Some possible reasons include the existence of a technical gap, the lack of willingness to change, or the perception that it is or will be too difficult to change the nature of the business.

In conclusion, Sosrowijayan provides an interesting case study for the “domino effect” that is present in the tourist industry. It could also be a case study for how the tourist industry copes with different forms of changes, including competition from other kinds of tourism-related activities, new developments, events, technologies, etc., in order to remain relevant.

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This article was written by Violet Ng Hui Zhi, an undergraduate student at National University of Singapore, while working as an intern at Center for Southeast Asian Social Studies (CESASS).

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Photo by Nemanja .O. on Unsplash

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